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TAX IN THE CATHEDRAL: PROPERTY RULES, LIABILITY 
RULES, AND TAX 
Andrew Blair-Stanek* 
HE distinction between property rules and liability rules has revo-
lutionized our understanding of many areas of law. But scholars 
have long assumed that this distinction has no relevance to tax law. 
This assumption is flatly wrong. Tax law currently uses both property 
rules and liability rules, and the choice between them has real conse-
quences. When a taxpayer violates a requirement for a favorable tax 
status, tax law either imposes additional tax proportionate to the harm 
(a liability rule) or imposes the draconian penalty of taking away the 
tax status entirely (a property rule). This recognition has three key im-
plications. First, Congress can and should draw on the rich property 
and liability rule literature to draft better tax legislation and to reform 
the tax code. Second, novel variations on property and liability rules 
can be used to rethink the remedies given to the IRS. Third, tax law will 
enrich the literature on property and liability rules across many other 
areas of law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a pioneering 1972 article, Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed 
introduced the distinction between “property rules” and “liability rules.”1 
Property-rule remedies like injunctions protect by deterrence, while lia-
bility-rule remedies protect by requiring compensation. Property rules 
and liability rules are “workhorse concepts that permeate every corner of 
the economic analysis of law.”2 Scholars have used these concepts to 
draw insights into areas as diverse as torts, property, contracts, intellec-
tual property, and constitutional law.3 But the common wisdom has been 
that tax law relies entirely on liability rules, and that the property and li-
ability rule distinction has no use in tax law. As one leading scholar put 
it in the Yale Law Journal, tax law is the “quintessential liability rule re-
gime.”4 
This common wisdom is wrong. Tax law uses both property rules and 
liability rules. The extensive scholarship on property rules and liability 
rules can and should be used to improve tax law. And tax law can con-
tribute to the broader property and liability rule debate across all areas of 
law. 
Consider briefly the quintessential scenario for property and liability 
rules: a factory’s pollution harms neighboring residents. Tort law has 
two basic approaches to protecting the residents’ entitlement to clean 
air.5 First, a liability rule requires the factory to pay compensatory dam-
 
1 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972). 
2 Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1403, 1404–05 (2009).  
3 E.g., Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Re-
lated Doctrines, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1993); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property 
Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1996); Eugene 
Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 56 
Stan. L. Rev. 755 (2004); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability 
Rules Govern Information?, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 783 (2007).  
4 Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 Yale L.J. 2175, 2197 (1997) (arguing 
that Louis Kaplow naturally brought pro-liability-rule tendencies to the property- and liabil-
ity-rule scholarship because he has made major contributions to the study of “that quintes-
sential liability rule regime, tax”).  
5 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092. Calabresi and Melamed discuss a third type 
of rule, inalienability rules, which forbid selling the entitlement. Id. at 1092–93. They recog-
nize, “[i]nalienability rules are thus quite different from property and liability rules,” id. at 
1093 (emphasis added), and therefore treat them separately. Id. at 1106. Although inaliena-
bility has applications in tax law, these applications will be addressed in a subsequent article.  
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ages to the residents but allows the pollution to continue.6 Second, a 
property rule imposes a much harsher penalty on the factory. Examples 
of property-rule remedies include injunctions, prison terms, and dis-
gorgement (that is, forcing the factory to disgorge all its profits).7 Liabil-
ity rules set a price that compensates residents, so that the factory will 
pollute only when it is economically efficient; property rules set a penal-
ty so high that the factory should never rationally pollute. 
The same dichotomy appears in tax law, most notably in the require-
ments to qualify for a favorable tax status, such as being a tax-exempt 
public charity. When a taxpayer violates a requirement for a favorable 
tax status, tax law has two basic approaches for protecting the govern-
ment’s entitlement to compliance. First, it can increase the taxpayer’s 
taxes by an amount that compensates the government for the harm that 
violating the requirement caused, such as lost tax revenues, while the 
taxpayer retains the favorable tax status. This is a liability rule. Second, 
tax law can strip the taxpayer of the tax status entirely, resulting in a 
sharp, punitive rise in taxes. This is a high penalty that no taxpayer 
should rationally incur. Status-loss is a property-rule remedy. It is a form 
of disgorgement, requiring the taxpayer to disgorge all benefits from the 
tax status. 
An example illustrates the distinction. Consider a university that qual-
ifies as a public charity, which not only makes the university tax exempt, 
but also allows donors to deduct donations.8 To qualify for public chari-
ty status, the university must satisfy numerous requirements. 
One requirement is that public charities must be “operated exclusive-
ly” for exempt purposes, such as education.9 Suppose that the university 
owns land that it plans one day to use for a dormitory, but that it current-
ly uses for a parking lot that is open to the public and that charges by the 
hour. The university is no longer “operated exclusively” for exempt pur-
poses, because it is operating a commercial parking lot in addition to be-
ing operated for educational purposes. But it does not lose its favorable 
status as a public charity.10 Rather, the university must pay a special 
 
6 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092, 1121; e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 
257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970) (awarding permanent damages to residents against a near-
by cement factory).  
7 See Ian Ayres, Optional Law: The Structure of Legal Entitlements 13 (2005). 
8 I.R.C. §§ 501(a), 501(c)(3), 170(a)(1), 170(c)(2) (2006).  
9 Id. § 501(c)(3) (listing exempt purposes).  
10 At some point, if too much of the university’s operations are unrelated trade or business 
activities, then it might lose its 501(c)(3) status, but tax law is generally very forgiving on 
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tax11 that approximately equals the income tax that a for-profit corpora-
tion operating the same parking lot would have paid. The “operated ex-
clusively” requirement is thus protected by a liability rule that compen-
sates the government for the lost tax revenue,12 thus setting a “price” so 
that the university can choose whether to violate the “operated exclu-
sively” requirement by operating the parking lot. 
But not all tax-status requirements are protected by liability rules. For 
example, another requirement that the university must meet to be a pub-
lic charity is that it “not participate in, or intervene in (including the pub-
lishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf 
of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”13 Suppose that 
the university circulated leaflets expressly advocating the defeat of a 
Member of Congress who opposed public funding for scientific re-
search. In this case, the university has violated the requirement that it not 
participate or intervene in elections. The law provides that the university 
entirely loses its status as a public charity.14 This status-loss means not 
only that the university must pay tax on all of its income,15 but also that 
donors cannot deduct their contributions to it.16 This property-rule reme-
dy sets the penalty so high that no university would rationally incur it.  
 
this point. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) (2006); Peter Molk, Reforming Nonprofit Ex-
emption Requirements, 17 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 475, 515 & n.189 (2012) (arguing 
inter alia for moving to a pure liability rule for this requirement). See generally Frances R. 
Hill & Douglas M. Mancino, Taxation of Exempt Organizations ¶ 21.03[1] (2013) (discuss-
ing the effect of unrelated business income).  
11 I.R.C. § 511(a) (imposing the unrelated business income tax).  
12 Requiring tax-exempt entities to compensate the government levels the playing field be-
tween tax-exempt and for-profit businesses engaged in the same for-profit activity. See S. 
Rep. No. 81-2375, at 28–29 (1950). 
13 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).  
14 Id. § 501(a), 501(c)(3).  
15 Universities are an example of what Henry Hansmann called “commercial nonprofits,” 
in that much of their income comes from the provision of a good or service, specifically tui-
tion paid for education. See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Or-
ganizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 Yale L.J. 54, 59 (1981) (internal quotations 
omitted). Hansmann notes that many non-profits have substantial net earnings that could be 
subject to corporate taxation. Id. at 56, 58–59. Donations, meanwhile, could be income to a 
tax-exempt organization just as amounts paid to Tiffany’s for a gift to a third party are in-
come to Tiffany’s. Id. at 61–62; see also Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemp-
tion of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 Yale L.J. 299, 307–16 
(1976) (noting that normal tax principles are inappropriate for taxing non-profits); cf. Hans-
mann, supra, at 59 (arguing that “Bittker and Rahdert overstate the difficulties” in calculat-
ing a non-profit’s net income).  
16 I.R.C. § 170(a)(1), (c)(2). 
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Part I of this Article explains further how imposing status-loss is a 
property-rule remedy, just as injunctions and disgorgement are property-
rule remedies in the common law. It also discusses the central im-
portance of tax statuses throughout tax law, which uses statuses to de-
termine tax rates, tax exemptions, exclusions, deductions, and credits. 
Tax statuses can apply not only to non-profit entities such as universi-
ties, but also to individuals, business entities, properties, transactions, 
and debts. Although status-loss is the most common property-rule reme-
dy in tax law, Section I.F gives examples of several other property-rule 
remedies in tax. Section I.G then gives examples of liability rules in tax. 
In short, Part I conclusively disproves the conventional wisdom that tax 
law is the “quintessential liability rule regime.”17 
Scholars have produced a rich literature to guide lawmakers and judg-
es in choosing between property and liability rules in different situa-
tions. Part II explores how lawmakers can draw on these scholarly in-
sights to best protect tax-status requirements. For example, liability rules 
can substantially reduce taxpayers’ compliance costs for requirements 
that are ambiguous. Liability rules can also encourage economically ef-
ficient transactions and improve settlement negotiations between tax-
payers and the IRS. Surprisingly, a simple model of IRS utility demon-
strates that, in many instances, liability rules do a better job of deterring 
taxpayers from violating tax-status requirements than draconian property 
rules. Meanwhile, other considerations identified by scholars, such as 
calculation costs and biases, may weigh in favor of using property rules 
in other situations. Congress can and should draft better tax legislation 
by understanding the property and liability rule distinction. 
But tax law can expand beyond plain property and liability rules. 
Scholars have developed many novel variations, and Part III shows how 
these innovative remedies can be used to rethink how the IRS protects 
tax-status requirements. For example, “pliability rules”—where a trig-
gering event switches from one rule (either property or liability) to a 
second rule (also either property or liability)18—can be used for purposes 
as varied as encouraging taxpayers to disclose information to the IRS or 
helping taxpayers to survive financial crises. Another example is the 
“Rule 4” remedy: In the pollution dispute, Rule 4 involves enjoining the 
polluting factory but requiring the neighboring residents to compensate 
 
17 Rose, supra note 4.  
18 See infra Section III.B.  
BLAIR-STANEK_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 9/24/2013 5:34 PM 
2013] Tax in the Cathedral 1175 
the factory for shutting down.19 In tax law, Rule 4 can be used to protect 
students when their university violates a requirement for public charity 
status. Part III also explores several other new IRS remedies drawn from 
the broader property and liability rule literature. 
Recognizing the relevance of the property and liability rule distinction 
to tax law can inform the broader literature across numerous other areas 
of law, as Part IV shows. Over the years, applying the distinction to con-
tract law, intellectual property, and constitutional law has enriched the 
broader debate.20 Each new area of law has brought new examples (and 
counterexamples) and unmasked implicit assumptions. Tax law is no 
different. For example, the IRS will often prefer not to get additional 
money from taxpayers who violate a requirement, because the IRS seeks 
proportional remedies and responds to political and media pressure.21 
This reveals the assumption implicit throughout the existing literature 
that parties always prefer to receive more money from the other side. 
Another contribution tax law can make to the broader literature is as a 
testing ground for scholars’ predictions and novel remedies, as lawmak-
ers constantly seek ways to increase tax revenues while keeping taxpay-
ers happy. 
Tax law has both property rules and liability rules. This recognition 
has concrete implications for tax law, as well as implications for the on-
going scholarly debate about property rules and liability rules in all areas 
of law. 
I. REMEDIES IN TAX LAW 
This Part begins with a brief overview of the rich property and liabil-
ity rule scholarship, and moves on to give examples of tax statuses used 
throughout the Article to illustrate remedies in tax law. The Part then 
demonstrates why taking away a tax status is a property rule. It con-
cludes with examples of property rules and liability rules in tax. 
A. Property Rules and Liability Rules 
Calabresi and Melamed’s seminal 1972 article, Property Rules, Lia-
bility Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,22 which 
 
19 See infra Section III.D. 
20 See infra notes 344–49.  
21 See infra Subsection II.C.1.  
22 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1.  
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scholars often simply call “The Cathedral,”23 introduced the distinction 
between property rules and liability rules. Since then, the distinction has 
resulted in a flowering of scholarship.24 
Notably, scholars have generated numerous insights into the relative 
merits of property and liability rules in different situations.25 For exam-
ple, many scholars argue that property rules encourage negotiated effi-
cient resolutions (such as sales), and that liability rules are preferable 
when high transaction costs make such consensual resolutions difficult.26 
Others have noted, for example, that property rules encourage overin-
vestment in search costs, because accidentally taking an entitlement in-
curs draconian punishments.27 
Scholars have hardly limited themselves to debating the merits of 
property and liability rules—they have developed entirely new remedies. 
Calabresi and Melamed themselves started this process in their path-
breaking article by recognizing the possibility of a new remedy called 
 
23 E.g., Emily Sherwin, Introduction: Property Rules as Remedies, 106 Yale L.J. 2083, 
2084 (1997). 
24 See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 7; Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 Yale L.J. 703 (1996); Ian Ayres & Paul M. 
Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules, 100 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1 (2001); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitle-
ment to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L.J. 1027 (1995); Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing 
Options, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1399 (2005); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3; A. Mitchell Polin-
sky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, 
and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1979); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving 
Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1075 (1980); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 
Va. L. Rev. 965 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Exclusion]; Henry E. Smith, Property and Prop-
erty Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Property]. 
25 Ayres, supra note 7, at 183–200 (discussing the property rule vs. liability rule debate); 
Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Correlated Values in the Theory of Property and Liability 
Rules, 32 J. Legal Stud. 121, 129–48 (2003) (refuting the argument for property rules when 
different parties’ values are correlated); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability 
Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 601, 619–32 (2001) (consider-
ing ex ante incentives created by different rules); Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The 
Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 Yale L.J. 2091, 2096 (1997) (arguing that 
liability rules are rightfully the exception).  
26 Ayres & Balkin, supra note 24, at 705–06 & n.9; James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, 
Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440, 
450–51 (1995) (deeming it a “virtual doctrine” that “[w]hen transaction costs are low, use 
property rules; when transaction costs are high, use liability rules”).  
27 Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property 
Rights, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1285, 1297 (2008) (building on the work of Thomas W. Merrill, 
Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. Legal Stud. 13 
(1985)).  
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“Rule 4” that awards an entitlement to a defendant but protects it with 
only a liability rule.28 Subsequent scholars have developed an array of 
creative new remedies,29 drawing on seemingly unrelated areas such as 
option theory.30 
Professors Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell made the important ob-
servation that property rule and liability rule remedies lie along a con-
tinuum from zero damages to infinitely high damages.31 Liability rules 
set the remedy to compensatory damages, while property rules simply 
set the remedy much higher up the continuum.32 In other words, proper-
ty-rule remedies can be put into dollar terms, and property and liability 
rules can be viewed as differing only in degree of severity. This observa-
tion opened up the entire continuum of possible remedies for discussion. 
As they observed, “the fully optimal rule may be neither one with ex-
treme damages (that is, a property rule) nor one with damages equal to 
harm (that is, the conventional liability rule).”33 
Kaplow and Shavell followed Calabresi and Melamed in drawing 
their examples from torts and property.34 Other scholars have fruitfully 
applied the property and liability rule distinction to numerous other are-
as, including contract law,35 constitutional law,36 and intellectual proper-
ty.37 But no one has yet applied the distinction in tax law, with the ex-
ception of one fleeting reference by Professor Henry Smith.38 
Smith proposed an innovative intermediate tax filing status for married 
couples. A detail of implementing this proposal would be how to recap-
ture benefits that later turned out to be inappropriate. In passing, Smith 
 
28 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1116 (calling this a “fourth rule”); Rose, supra 
note 4, at 2178 (their fourth rule is now uniformly called “Rule 4”). Rule 4 is discussed in 
greater depth infra Section III.D. 
29 E.g., Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules and Startling 
Rules, 106 Yale L.J. 2149, 2156 tbl.2, 2157 tbl.3, 2159 tbl.4, 2163 tbl.5, app. at 2173 (1997) 
(listing various remedies developed, including origins); Madeline Morris, The Structure of 
Entitlements, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 822 (1993).  
30 E.g., Ayres, supra note 7, at 5; Morris, supra note 29, at 852, 854.  
31 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 24, at 756–57.  
32 Id. at 756. Of course, property rules in favor of defendants are the same as zero damages 
(that is, the bottom of the continuum).  
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 748–55, 760–62.  
35 E.g., Craswell, supra note 3.  
36 E.g., Kontorovich, supra note 3.  
37 E.g., Lemley & Weiser, supra note 3.  
38 Henry E. Smith, Intermediate Filing in Household Taxation, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 145, 192 
(1998).  
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noted that “the recapture rule could fall anywhere on the continuum from 
liability rule to property rule.”39 Unfortunately, Smith did not further in-
vestigate the relative merits of using property rules or liability rules for his 
innovative proposal, let alone for tax law in general. But Smith’s passing 
reference does reinforce this Article’s basic insight that tax law has not 
only liability rules, but also property rules and rules falling in between. 
B. Tax Statuses 
This Article uses the term “tax status” to refer to the qualification of a 
taxpayer, a property, or a transaction for particular treatment under the 
tax laws. Sometimes the tax code actually uses the word “status” to de-
scribe what this Article calls a tax status, as with “tax-exempt status.”40 
Sometimes the tax code instead uses the word “qualification,” as, for ex-
ample, with “qualified retirement plan,”41 which is a tax status. Other 
times the tax code simply uses the status’s specific name (for example, 
“S corporation”42) to describe the tax status. 
Tax statuses are essential to the working of the tax laws. They determine 
basic matters such as whether a taxpayer must pay tax, what rates apply, 
whether a deduction is allowed, whether the taxpayer can take a credit, and 
how taxable income is calculated. Congress loves adding new tax statuses.43 
Entities can potentially qualify for a dizzying array of tax statuses, in-
cluding C corporation,44 S corporation,45 partnership,46 numerous varie-
ties of tax exemption,47 consolidated group,48 bank,49 regulated invest-
 
39 Id.  
40 E.g., I.R.C. § 501(p) (2006) (“tax-exempt status”); id. § 142(d)(7) (“tax-exempt status”); 
id. § 62(b)(3)(C) (“marital status”); id. § 150(d)(3) (“status as qualified scholarship funding 
corporation”); id. § 507 (“private foundation status”).  
41 See id. § 4974(c) (defining “qualified retirement plan” as including various plans under 
§§ 401, 403, and 408); see also id. §§ 401, 403(a) & (b), 408(a) & (b). For other examples of 
“qualification” for a status, see, e.g., id. § 953(e)(4) (defining “[q]ualifying insurance com-
pany branch”); id. § 48(c)(4)(B) (defining “[q]ualifying small wind turbine”).  
42 See Rev. Proc. 96-30 § 4.04(3), 1996-1 C.B. 696, 704 (“An alternative transaction that 
will cause the loss of a favorable special tax status, such as an existing S corporation elec-
tion, will ordinarily be viewed as unduly expensive.” (emphasis added)). 
43 See, e.g., infra notes 44–74.  
44 I.R.C. §§ 11 & 1361(a)(2).  
45 Id. § 1361(a)(1).  
46 Id. § 761(a) (2006). 
47 E.g., id. § 501(c)(1)–(29).  
48 Id. § 1501. 
49 Id. § 581.  
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ment company,50 real estate investment trust,51 controlled foreign corpo-
ration,52 publicly traded partnership,53 U.S. real property holding corpo-
ration,54 passive foreign investment company,55 public utility,56 and po-
litical subdivision of a State.57 These statuses span business, civil so-
society, and state and local government. 
Individuals also may qualify for various tax statuses. Examples in-
clude resident alien,58 head of household,59 qualifying child,60 independ-
ent contractor,61 religious minister,62 and dependent.63 
Transactions may qualify for tax statuses, with some examples includ-
ing tax-free corporate reorganizations,64 various types of prohibited 
transactions,65 complete redemptions,66 and like-kind exchanges.67 Debts 
may qualify for statuses, with examples such as qualified education 
loan,68 qualified residence acquisition indebtedness,69 or applicable high 
yield discount obligation.70 Property may likewise qualify for statuses, 
including, for example, tax-exempt municipal bond,71 qualified low-
income housing,72 regular interest in a real estate mortgage investment 
conduit,73 and Section 1256 contract.74 
 
50 Id. § 851. 
51 Id. § 856.  
52 Id. § 957. 
53 Id. § 7704.  
54 Id. § 897(c)(2).  
55 Id. § 1297(a).  
56 Id. § 115(1).  
57 Id. 
58 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.871-2, 301.7701(b)-1 (2012).  
59 I.R.C. §§ 2(b), 7703(b).  
60 Id. § 24(c).  
61 Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(c)-1(b).  
62 I.R.C. § 107.  
63 Id. § 152.  
64 Id. § 368(a); see also id. §§ 336(c), 354(a)(1), 361(a), 1032(a) (making reorganizations 
tax-free to various taxpayers involved in the reorganization.  
65 Id. § 503(b) (prohibited transactions for certain tax-exempt organizations); id. 
§ 857(b)(6)(B)(iii) (prohibited transactions for REITs).  
66 Id. § 302(b)(3).  
67 Id. § 1031.  
68 Id. § 221(d)(1).  
69 Id. § 163(h)(3)(B).  
70 Id. § 163(e)(5).  
71 Id. § 103.  
72 Id. § 42(g)(1).  
73 Id. § 860G(a)(1)–(2).  
74 Id. § 1256(b).  
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Each tax status involves meeting multiple requirements. In U.S. fed-
eral tax law, each requirement is spelled out in the tax code, Treasury 
regulations, case law, or some combination thereof. 
Every status has an equal and opposite status consisting of not quali-
fying. As a matter of nomenclature, this Article uses the term “tax sta-
tus” to refer to whichever one is favorable (tax-minimizing) for the rele-
vant taxpayer.75 Therefore, whenever this Article refers to losing a tax 
status, the loss is always unfavorable for the taxpayer. 
U.S. federal tax law’s reliance on statuses is hardly unique. The tax 
laws of other countries,76 as well as of many U.S. states and local gov-
ernments,77 use tax statuses to organize their tax systems and achieve 
various policy goals. Tax treaties between countries also rely on tax sta-
tuses.78 Although this Article focuses on U.S. federal tax law, its analy-
sis applies fully to foreign, state, and local tax laws, as well as to tax 
treaties. 
C. Four Examples of Tax Statuses 
To illustrate the discussion, this Article focuses on the following four 
examples of tax statuses in the U.S. tax code. 
 
75 A status that is favorable for a taxpayer at a given time may be unfavorable at a different 
time or for a different taxpayer. For example, taxpayers sometimes seek to be taxed as cor-
porations, see, e.g., United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1954), while some 
seek to avoid being taxed as corporations, see, for example, Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 
U.S. 344, 348–49 (1935).  
76 E.g., Income Tax Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), § 149(1)(e) (Can.) (tax-exempt 
statuses). Numerous other countries have followed the U.S. in creating a special tax status 
for real estate investment trusts (“REITs”). Nat’l Ass’n of Real Estate Inv. Trusts, Frequently 
Asked Questions About REITs 28 (2011), available at http://www.reit.com/portals/0/
PDF/2011FAQ.pdf (listing countries); see 445 Parl. Deb., H.C. (6th ser.) (2006) 369 (U.K.), 
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo060424/debtext/
60424-08.htm#60424-08_spnew9 (statement of Des Browne, Chief Secretary to the Treasury) 
(explaining the United Kingdom’s adoption of REITs); cf. infra Subsection I.C.2 (discussing 
REITs in U.S. tax law).  
77 See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10-724 (LexisNexis 2010) (providing a tax status 
for property qualifying as an “aquaculture oyster float”).  
78 See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fis-
cal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Japan, art. 5, Nov. 6, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 
04,330 (defining “permanent establishment”).  
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1. Public Charities 
Examples of public charities include churches, homeless shelters, and 
private universities.79 Public charity status comes with two main bene-
fits: The entity itself is generally exempt from taxation,80 and donors to 
these organizations can reduce their own taxes by deducting their contri-
butions.81 
An organization must meet numerous requirements to qualify as a 
public charity. Many of these requirements generate ambiguity. Most 
importantly, the organization must be “organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific,” or other enumerated purpos-
es.82 These purposes have generated controversy, such as over the mean-
ing of “charitable.”83 
Another requirement is that “no part of the net earnings” of the organ-
ization may “inure[] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individ-
ual.”84 This requirement raises numerous questions. For example, how 
much can a charity reward its professional fundraisers?85 How well can 
it pay its president?86 
There are two separate restrictions on public charities’ political in-
volvement. First, no “substantial part” of the organization’s activities 
can consist of “carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to in-
 
79 Richard A. Westin, WG&L Tax Dictionary 568–69 (2002–2003) (defining “public char-
ity” as “a nontechnical term for exempt organizations that are described in [I.R.C.] 
§ 501(c)(3), but which are not private foundations”) (emphasis omitted). Not all organiza-
tions qualifying under 501(c)(3) are public charities; some are private foundations. See 
I.R.C. § 509 (2006) (defining “private foundation”); 5 Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, 
Federal Taxation of Income, Estates, and Gifts ¶ 100.1.2 (3d ed. 2012).  
80 I.R.C. § 501(a) (2006). In the case of a university that lost its 501(c)(3) status, taxable 
income would generally consist of gross income such as tuition minus deductions such as 
professors’ salaries. See id. §§ 61, 63.  
81 Id. § 170(a), (c)(2).  
82 Id. § 501(c)(3). This creates both an organizational test and an operational test. See 
Bittker & Lokken, supra note 79, ¶ 100.2. 
83 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 595–96, 605 (1983) (holding that a uni-
versity’s racial policies made it not qualify as “charitable”); Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 
15, at 330 (noting that neither Congress nor Treasury nor the IRS have ventured to define 
“charitable”). See generally Bittker & Lokken, supra note 79, ¶ 100.3.2.  
84 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). See generally Bittker & Lokken, supra note 79, ¶ 100.4 (discussing 
inurement test).  
85 See, e.g., United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1175–76 (7th Cir. 
1999).  
86 See Hill & Mancino, supra note 10, ¶ 4.03[6].  
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fluence legislation . . . .”87 But what is “substantial,” what is “propagan-
da,” and what is “legislation”? For instance, does this requirement cover 
attempts to influence executive-branch decisions?88 Second, public char-
ities must “not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or 
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate for public office.”89 But, aside from “the 
publishing or distributing of statements,” it is unclear what “participate” 
or “intervene” means.90 
2. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 
A real estate investment trust, or REIT (pronounced “reet”), is effec-
tively a mutual fund91 for real estate.92 The basic concept of mutual 
funds and REITs is the same: enabling small investors to buy into a pro-
fessionally managed, diversified portfolio.93 While traditional mutual 
funds invest in a portfolio of stocks and other securities, REITs invest in 
a portfolio of real estate assets. The 141 REITs traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange have a total market capitalization of $461 billion.94 
REITs own a wide variety of real estate assets ranging from warehouses 
and skyscrapers to mortgage-backed bonds and apartment buildings95—
including my apartment building. 
The key benefit of this status is that REITs are generally exempt from 
income tax, although the dividends a REIT pays out are fully taxable to 
its shareholders.96 Thus, if a REIT owns a building and earns rent, which 
it pays out to its shareholders, the rent is taxed only once. This treatment 
 
87 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).  
88 Hill & Mancino, supra note 10, ¶ 5.04[4] (discussing the instances when lobbying exec-
utive branch officials qualifies as attempting to influence legislation). 
89 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).  
90 Hill & Mancino, supra note 10, ¶ 6.04[1] (“Section 501(c)(3) provides no guidance with 
respect to the political prohibition.”).  
91 Designation as a mutual fund or “regulated investment company” is another example of 
a tax status. See I.R.C. § 851. 
92 Michael K. Carnevale et al., Real Estate Investment Trusts, in 742 Tax Management 
A-1 (3d ed. 2012). 
93 H.R. Rep. No. 86-2020, at 3–4 (1960). 
94 Nat’l Ass’n of Real Estate Inv. Trusts, REITWatch, June 2011, at 1, available at 
http://returns.reit.com/reitwatch/rw1106.pdf. 
95 Nat’l Ass’n of Real Estate Inv. Trusts, Frequently Asked Questions About REITs 2 
(2011), available at http://www.reit.com/portals/0/PDF/2011FAQ.pdf. 
96 4 Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 
¶ 99.5.1 (3d ed. 2003).  
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puts the REIT’s shareholders on equal footing with wealthy individuals 
who can own buildings directly and who are also taxed only once on 
rent. But losing REIT status is disastrous, causing the REIT to pay the 
full corporate tax rate,97 generally for the next five years,98 with its divi-
dends being taxable a second time to shareholders. 
Qualifying for REIT status requires meeting a detailed array of statu-
tory and regulatory requirements. Most of these requirements ensure that 
REIT status is available only to entities that allow small investors to in-
vest in diversified real estate portfolios. To give a taste of the complexi-
ty, the requirements include that the REIT’s shares be transferable,99 that 
there be at least 100 shareholders,100 that no five individuals own 50% or 
more of the stock,101 that at least 95% of the REIT’s gross income come 
from passive sources like interest,102 that at least 75% of its gross income 
be real-estate related, such as rent, mortgage interest, or gain on real es-
tate sales,103 and that at least 75% of its assets be passive investments.104 
3. Tax-Exempt Municipal Bonds 
Interest on bonds issued by state and local governments (generally 
called “municipal” bonds) is received tax-free.105 This is an exception to 
the general rule that interest is income to the recipient.106 This exemption 
allows state and local governments to borrow at lower interest rates.107 
Tax-exempt status for a municipal bond is an example of a tax status 
that applies to property, not an entity. 
Bonds must meet numerous, detailed requirements to qualify for this 
highly favorable status. Most obviously, they must be issued by a state 
or local government. But even this seemingly simple requirement has 
 
97 I.R.C. § 856(a)(3) (2006) (requiring that a REIT “(but for the provisions of this part) 
would be taxable as a domestic corporation”).  
98 Id. § 856(g)(3).  
99 Id. § 856(a)(2).  
100 Id. § 856(a)(5).  
101 Id. §§ 856(a)(6), 856(h)(1)(A), 542(a)(2).  
102 Id. § 856(c)(2).  
103 Id. § 856(c)(3). 
104 Id. § 856(c)(4). 
105 Id. § 103; cf. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 525 (1988) (holding that the U.S. 
Constitution does not require this tax exemption).  
106 I.R.C. § 61(a)(4). 
107 See 1 Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and 
Gifts ¶ 15.1.1 (3d ed. 1999).  
BLAIR-STANEK_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 9/24/2013 5:34 PM 
1184 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 99:1169 
caused controversy over issuers such as volunteer fire departments108 
and agencies created by multistate compact.109 A host of requirements 
prevent governments from using their lower borrowing costs for non-
governmental purposes.110 These and the many other requirements in-
volve substantial complexity and uncertainty.111 
4. Qualified Retirement Plans 
Qualified retirement plans, such as pension plans or Section 401(k) 
plans, bring substantial tax benefits to both employer and employees.112 
The employer gets an immediate (and thus more valuable113) deduction 
for amounts contributed to the plan.114 The employee defers taxes on 
contributions, typically until retirement years later.115 Additionally, in-
vestment income on the retirement assets is exempt from tax, and these 
tax savings compound exponentially, allowing the retirement assets to 
grow more rapidly.116 
These significant tax benefits come at the cost of compliance with an 
extraordinary number of requirements, which commentators have called 
“an ever-increasing maze of laws, rules, and regulations.”117 Some re-
quirements are procedural, such as requirements that the trust instrument 
be written, established in the United States, communicated to employ-
 
108 See Seagrave Corp. v. Comm’r, 38 T.C. 247, 250–51 (1962), superseded by statute, 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1301(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2654 (1986) (codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 150(e)). 
109 See Comm’r v. Shamberg’s Estate, 144 F.2d 998, 999–1000 (2d Cir. 1944) (divided 
panel).  
110 E.g., I.R.C. § 103(b)(1) (2006); Bittker & Lokken, supra note 107, ¶ 15.2 (discussing 
history and requirements relating to private activity bonds). 
111 See, e.g., Letter from Kathleen C. McKinney, National Association of Bond Lawyers, 
to Internal Revenue Serv., Tax Notes Today, June 14, 2010, LEXIS, 2010 TNT 113-93 (sug-
gesting eleven areas relating to tax-exempt bonds where the IRS should make issuing guid-
ance a priority). 
112 See generally Pamela D. Perdue, Qualified Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans ¶ 1.02 
(2011) (discussing the advantages of maintaining a tax-qualified plan).  
113 See Stephen F. Gertzman, Federal Tax Accounting ¶ 1.01[2] (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 
2012).  
114 I.R.C. § 404(a)(1), (5), (6) (2006). See generally Perdue, supra note 112, ¶ 1.02[1][a].  
115 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 401(k), 501(a). There are still other benefits to the employee, such 
as tax-free rollovers. Id. § 402(c); Perdue, supra note 112, ¶ 1.02[2][b].  
116 I.R.C. § 501(a). See generally Perdue, supra note 112, ¶ 1.02[1][b], [2][a].  
117 Perdue, supra note 112, ¶ 1.01. The primary statute governing plan qualification is the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006)). The IRS and Department of 
Labor dually administer ERISA. Perdue, supra note 112, ¶ 2.02.  
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ees, and permanent.118 Other requirements relate to substance, including 
requirements for minimum coverage,119 not discriminating in favor of 
highly compensated employees,120 minimum vesting and benefit accru-
al,121 minimum distributions,122 and diversification.123 Complying with 
this thicket of requirements has generated plenty of work for law 
firms.124 
D. Why Taxpayers Violate Requirements 
The reasons why taxpayers violate requirements can be grouped into 
four categories: tax law ambiguities, factual changes, ignorance of the 
tax law, and playing the “audit lottery.” 
First, legal ambiguity exists in tax as in all other areas of law. Some-
times no statute, IRS guidance, or case law is on point. Other times, ex-
isting law is subject to different reasonable interpretations.125 For in-
stance, REITs must have at least 75% of their assets invested in 
specified categories of property,126 but tax law is unclear as to whether 
assets used as collateral in common financing transactions count towards 
the required 75%.127 Although most practitioners believe they do count, 
 
118 Perdue, supra note 112, ¶ 2.04[1].  
119 I.R.C. § 410.  
120 Id. § 414(q).  
121 Id. § 411.  
122 Id. § 401(a)(9). 
123 Id. § 401(a)(35). 
124 See, e.g., Employee Benefits, McDermott Will & Emery, http://www.mwe.com/
Employee-Benefits--Pensions (last visited July 16, 2012). 
125 David Weisbach has discussed line-drawing in otherwise gray areas of tax. David A. 
Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing in the Tax Law, 29 J. Legal Stud. 71, 71 
(2000); David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency In The Tax Law, 84 
Cornell L. Rev. 1627, 1627 (1999). Weisbach’s articles focus on whether a line is crossed, 
while this Article looks at the result if a line is crossed.  
126 I.R.C. § 856(c)(4).  
127 The common financing transaction at issue is a sale-repurchase agreement (“repo”) of a 
mortgage-backed security. In entering a repo, a REIT would sell a mortgage-backed security 
to a counterparty for cash, but also contract to repurchase the security later at a higher price 
constituting interest on the sales proceeds. Although repos are generally understood by prac-
titioners to be secured loans for tax purposes, the question is ambiguous. See William W. 
Chip, Are Repos Really Loans?, 95 Tax Notes 1057 (May 13, 2002). If repos are indeed se-
cured loans, the securities used as collateral remain assets of the REIT for the 75% asset test. 
But if repos are sales, the securities are not assets of the REIT for the duration of the repo, 
meaning they no longer count towards the 75% test.  
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many REITs would unexpectedly find themselves in violation of the 
75% asset test if the IRS or a court were to decide otherwise.128 
Second, factual changes—ranging from business exigencies, to com-
pliance with non-tax law,129 to accidental paperwork failures—can also 
cause taxpayers to violate requirements. For example, a REIT may gen-
erate most of its income from rents, thereby meeting the requirement 
that at least 75% of a REIT’s gross income must come from real-estate 
sources.130 But in a recession, some tenants may stop paying rent, caus-
ing the percentage of gross income from real-estate sources to fall below 
the 75% threshold. Similarly, a church’s tax-exempt status might be im-
periled by a guest preacher’s unexpected advocacy of a political candi-
date. Or, a qualified retirement plan might accidentally misfile paper-
work, leading the entire plan to lose its qualification.131 
Third, ignorance of tax law’s requirements is common, which is un-
derstandable due to the tax code’s extraordinary length and complexi-
ty.132 For example, church leaders may not be aware of the no-
campaigning requirement for public charities. A small business owner 
may not understand the requirements for retirement plan qualification. 
And a REIT’s lawyers and accountants may miss a potential legal issue. 
Finally, some taxpayers simply play the “audit lottery,” which is tak-
ing an incorrect tax position on one’s return and hoping the IRS does not 
audit the return and discover the problem.133 Like the traditional lottery, 
the “audit lottery” is a game of chance.134 A taxpayer playing the “audit 
 
128 See AG Mortgage Investment Trust, Inc., Prospectus, SEC Registration No. 333-
172656, at 69 (June 29, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1514281/000119312511179374/d424b1.htm. (“The failure of RMBS subject to repurchase 
agreements to qualify as real estate assets could adversely affect our ability to qualify as a 
REIT.”). 
129 See, e.g., Cherry-Burrell Corp. v. United States, 367 F.2d 669, 677–78 (8th Cir. 1966) 
(noting that corporate law considerations prevented a taxpayer from meeting status require-
ments and forgiving the violation based on the statute’s purpose). 
130 I.R.C. § 856(c)(3). 
131 See, e.g., Fazi v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 695, 700 (1994). 
132 See Michael J. Graetz, The U.S. Income Tax 293 (1999) (“[The Internal Revenue Code 
is] now more than six times longer than Tolstoy’s War and Peace and considerably harder to 
parse.”).  
133 Richard A. Westin, WG&L Tax Dictionary 59 (2002–2003) (defining “audit lottery” as 
“a slang term for the fact that one can take an incorrect tax position on one’s return and pre-
vail in the sense of not being discovered. The notion is that by doing so, one plays a game of 
chance, i.e., the audit lottery.”).  
134 Id. 
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lottery” may violate a requirement but hope that the IRS will not discov-
er the violation.135 
None of these four considerations are unique to tax law. For example, 
an author may potentially infringe another’s copyright due to legal am-
biguity about the fair use doctrine. Authors revising their manuscript 
may accidentally quote another’s work. Authors may be ignorant of 
copyright law’s requirements, or may simply hope that their infringe-
ment goes undiscovered. In copyright and other areas of law, such viola-
tions can be remedied by either property rules or liability rules, and the 
same is true in tax law. 
E. Tax Status-Loss Is a Property Rule 
Although injunctions are perhaps the quintessential property-rule 
remedy, disgorgement is also a traditional property-rule remedy.136 In-
deed, the economic consequences of an injunction are nearly identical to 
those of disgorgement. 
Consider a nuisance dispute where a factory increases its profits 
$20 million annually by emitting pollution that inflicts $1 million in 
annual harm on neighboring residents. A liability rule would require 
 
135 There are various procedural measures to deter such behavior, including penalties and 
sanctions. E.g., I.R.C. § 6662; 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.50–53 (Circular No. 230) (2007). 
136 Ayres, supra note 7, at 13 (“[D]isgorgement and prison terms are traditional property-
rule remedies . . . .”); see Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance 
of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 62 (1999); accord Emily Sherwin, Prop-
erty, Rules, and Property Rules 22 (Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers No. 26, 2007), 
available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/26 (“A more promising form of 
property rule is restitution of profits.”). Restitution of profits is disgorgement by definition. 
Black’s Law Dictionary 536 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “disgorgement” as “[t]he act of giving 
up something (such as profits illegally obtained) on demand or by legal compulsion”). 
 Disgorgement is just one type of supracompensatory damages, which scholars recognize 
as property-rule remedies. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 7, at 83 tbl.5.1 (showing high damag-
es of $100 as a property rule); id. at 147 (“[I]f the damages are greater than $100 (the highest 
valuation of any potential defendant), then the plaintiff’s entitlement is property-like in na-
ture.”); Ayres & Talley, supra note 24, at 1041 (stating that an entitlement protected by dam-
ages higher than any potential taker’s valuation is “property-like” in nature); see also id. at 
1045 (referring again to “property-like” damages as damages exceeding valuation); Cras-
well, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that “damage measures designed to deter breach rather than 
merely to compensate the promisee—for example, in terrorem penalty clauses or punitive 
damages” are property rules); Epstein, supra note 25, at 2096 (arguing that Roman law’s 
remedy of giving a plaintiff the right to set liability very high was “an early preference for 
the property rules”); David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraor-
dinary Legal Sanctions, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1990); Smith, Property, supra note 24, at 1742 
(noting that property rules are associated with very high levels of liability and injunctions). 
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the factory to pay $1 million in damages each year to the residents, but 
allow the factory to continue polluting.137 This $1 million compensates 
the residents for taking their entitlement to clean air. But if a court in-
stead issues an injunction against the pollution, the factory will ration-
ally pay the residents any amount up to $20 million (its profits from 
polluting) to dissolve the injunction.138 With an injunction, the resi-
dents can force the factory to “disgorge” an amount up to its full prof-
its from the pollution. 
Court-ordered disgorgement has the same effect as an injunction. If 
the factory must disgorge all its profits earned from polluting, it will 
simply stop polluting, unless it can settle with the residents to pay some-
thing less than its full profits. 
Tax status-loss is a form of disgorgement, specifically disgorgement 
of all the tax benefits from the status. For example, suppose that a 
REIT’s tax status will allow it to save $20 million in taxes over the next 
five years, which is the period during which status-loss lasts for a 
REIT.139 Moreover, suppose that this REIT violates a requirement that 
harms the Treasury by $1 million. A liability-rule remedy might impose 
$1 million in additional taxes, and, indeed, several REIT requirements 
are protected by liability rules.140 But, by contrast, status-loss forces the 
REIT to disgorge the full $20 million in tax benefits, which is a proper-
ty-rule remedy.141 Compliance with a requirement protected by status-
loss is, as a practical matter, mandated.142 
 
137 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (1970) (awarding permanent 
damages to residents against a nearby cement factory). 
138 See Polinsky, supra note 24, at 1077 (using this example and referring to this as the 
“extortion” argument against property-rule protection).  
139 I.R.C. § 856(g)(3).  
140 E.g., id. § 857(b)(5) (subjecting REIT to a 100% tax on an amount based on the magni-
tude of the failure to meet the gross income tests); id. § 857(b)(6)(A) (subjecting REIT to 
100% tax on prohibited transaction income).  
141 Taking away a tax status may be permanent, as with id. § 7704(c)(1)–(2) (publicly trad-
ed partnerships), or it may be for a period of years, as with REITs, id. § 856(g)(3). The 
length or permanency of status-loss is irrelevant; the relevant issue for status-loss is the value 
of all tax benefits lost.  
142 See Henry E. Smith, Ambiguous Quality Changes from Taxes and Legal Rules, 67 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 647, 661 (2000) (“What we commonly call ‘tax’ laws can often have the effect 
of mandating features of a transaction or activity. For example, the Internal Revenue Code’s 
provisions on the qualifications for tax-exempt status and for eligibility for deductible chari-
table contributions have the effect of regulating the form in which charities and some other 
organizations do business.” (emphasis added)).  
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A straightforward example demonstrates how tax status-loss has re-
sults identical to an injunction. Suppose the IRS got an injunction bar-
ring the REIT from calculating its taxes using the favorable REIT rules 
that save $20 million in taxes over five years. This injunction would cost 
the REIT the same $20 million as status-loss. 
The IRS is the entitlement holder under both status-loss and the liabil-
ity rules currently in the tax code. Specifically, the IRS holds the enti-
tlement to compliance with tax-status requirements.143 Similarly, in the 
nuisance example, both an injunction against the factory and damages 
paid to the residents give the entitlement to the residents, specifically the 
entitlement to clean air. 
When an injunction is a court’s only possible remedy for a nuisance 
like the polluting factory, there are three possible outcomes. Assume, as 
above, that the factory increases its profits $20 million by polluting, 
while the neighbors suffer $1 million in harm. First, the judge may issue 
an injunction, and the residents and factory may then negotiate a settle-
ment whereby the factory pays something between $1 million and 
$20 million to the residents to dissolve the injunction. This is the social-
ly optimal outcome because the $20 million in benefits of the pollution 
exceed the $1 million costs to the residents by $19 million. Second, the 
judge may issue an injunction, but negotiations between residents and 
the factory may fail, causing the factory to cease pollution. This failure 
results in a net loss to society of $19 million, and much of the property- 
and liability-rule scholarship considers how to avoid such inefficient 
outcomes.144 Third, the judge may decline to issue an injunction alto-
gether, because the costs imposed on the factory vastly exceed the bene-
fits to the residents.145 This no-remedy outcome often results when only 
 
143 In the two-by-two matrix resulting from Calabresi and Melamed’s work, the rows cor-
respond to who gets the entitlement, while the columns correspond to whether the entitle-
ment is protected by a property rule or liability rule. See Ayres, supra note 7, at 14 tbl.2.1 
(reproducing the matrix). The possibility of giving the entitlement, instead, to the taxpayer, 
and protecting it with a liability rule (that is, Rule 4) is discussed infra Section III.D. 
144 See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 7, at 24; Ayres & Talley, supra note 24, at 1029–33 (using 
liability rules to improve bargaining); cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1107 (not-
ing freeloader issues). Carol Rose notes that such a failure might result either from the costs 
of bringing together “numerous or indistinctly defined interested parties” or from “the im-
pediments that come after bargaining begins, from parties who are close-mouthed, poker-
faced, strategically bargaining misanthropes.” Rose, supra note 4, at 2184.  
145 This result is what the property- and liability-rule literature calls a “Rule 3,” whereby 
the factory’s right to pollute is protected by a property rule.  
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property rules are available to decision makers (typically judges), and 
such remedies are too draconian under the relevant circumstances.146 
Similarly, there are three possible outcomes when a taxpayer violates 
a tax-status requirement protected solely by status-loss. First, the IRS 
and the taxpayer may reach a settlement allowing the taxpayer to keep 
the status but pay some portion of the status’ tax benefit. The vast major-
ity of tax disputes are settled.147 This outcome is analogous to a court en-
joining the factory’s pollution, but the factory paying the residents some 
portion of its profits to dissolve the injunction. Second, negotiations be-
tween the IRS and the taxpayer may break down, with the taxpayer los-
ing the tax status entirely. This outcome is analogous to a breakdown in 
negotiations between the factory and residents to dissolve the injunction. 
Third, the IRS or a court148 may see status-loss as too draconian and de-
cline to impose it entirely. This outcome is analogous to a judge refusing 
to enjoin the factory’s pollution. 
In sum, when a taxpayer violates a tax-status requirement protected in 
the tax code or Treasury regulations only by status-loss, there are actual-
ly three possible outcomes: a negotiated settlement that allows the tax-
payer to keep its status but pay the IRS; the taxpayer’s loss of the status; 
or no remedy at all. 
Unless the relevant tax code or Treasury regulation section provides 
that violating a requirement results in some compensatory additional tax 
(a liability rule), then the remedy for violation is status-loss (a property 
rule).149 In other words, status-loss is the default remedy for violating a 
requirement, with liability rules applying only when specifically provid-
ed. 
 
146 See discussion infra note 243 (citing examples of judges avoiding finding violations 
when that necessitates a draconian property-rule remedy).  
147 Michael I. Saltzman, IRS Practice and Procedure ¶ 9.01 (“In tens of thousands of cases 
each year, Appeals officers negotiate and in about 85 to 90 percent of the cases settle with 
taxpayers.”). These statistics reflect all types of tax disputes, not just violations of tax-status 
requirements, but one would expect that similar majorities of violations are settled.  
148 Many tax-status requirements provide sufficient ambiguity for a court to decline to im-
pose status-loss when that is too draconian. See, e.g., Cherry-Burrell Corp. v. United States, 
367 F.2d 669, 676–77 (8th Cir. 1966) (straining interpretation of tax-free liquidation status to 
avoid unduly harsh result, at one point commenting the “intendment of the statute should not 
be thwarted by technical niceties”).  
149 See, e.g., Christy & Swan Profit Sharing Plan v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA), No. 2011-62, 
at 18 (2011) (noting that the “requirements that a plan must satisfy for qualification under 
section 401(a) must be strictly met,” and if not, status is lost).  
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F. Other Property Rules in Tax Law 
Status-loss is the most widespread property-rule remedy in federal tax 
law, but it is not the only one. Jail time is a property-rule remedy,150 and 
it is used in tax for serious procedural violations, such as willfully not 
filing tax returns151 or threatening physical harm to an IRS agent.152 Su-
pracompensatory damages such as punitive damages are also property-
rule remedies,153 and the civil tax fraud penalty fits in this mold.154 
Congress has occasionally sought to impose taxes modeled on com-
mon-law property-rule remedies such as disgorgement.155 For example, 
in 1919, Congress passed the Child Labor Tax Law,156 which required a 
business employing child labor to pay a tax of one-tenth of its profits. In 
other words, the government’s remedy against employing children was 
disgorgement of one-tenth of profits. This tax was a property rule, set-
ting a penalty intended to be so high that no taxpayer would employ 
children. But the Supreme Court struck down this tax in Bailey v. Drexel 
Furniture Co.157 as exceeding Congress’ constitutional taxing power. 
The Supreme Court recently distinguished Drexel Furniture in Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,158 upholding the 
individual mandate to purchase health insurance159 as a “tax on going 
without health insurance.”160 The Court’s rationale was essentially that 
Drexel Furniture involved a property rule, while the individual mandate 
is a liability rule that compensates for the harm caused by going without 
health insurance. The Court emphasized that the tax in Drexel Furniture 
“imposed an exceedingly heavy burden,”161 while the individual man-
 
150 Ayres, supra note 7, at 13.  
151 I.R.C. § 7203 (2006).  
152 Id. § 7212(a). Other examples of tax crimes include id. § 7201 (willfully attempting to 
evade or defeat taxes), § 7202 (willful failure to collect or pay over tax), § 7206 (false re-
turns), § 7207 (false documents). See generally 6 Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Fed-
eral Taxation of Income, Estates, and Gifts ¶ 114.9 (2d ed. 2012) (tax-crimes overview).  
153 Smith, Property, supra note 24, at 1720 (“Such ‘property rules’ would include injunc-
tions and supracompensatory damages . . . .”); see authorities cited supra note 136.  
154 I.R.C. § 6663(a) (penalty of 75% of underpayment).  
155 Ayres, supra note 7, at 13 (“[D]isgorgement and prison terms are traditional property-
rule remedies . . . .”).  
156 Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1057, 1138 (1919).  
157 259 U.S. 20, 44 (1922).  
158 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2595–96 (2012).  
159 Id. § 5000A(a). 
160 132 S. Ct. at 2599.  
161 Id. at 2595.  
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date payment will never be more than the cost of insurance.162 The Court 
stated, “It may often be a reasonable financial decision to make the [in-
dividual mandate] payment rather than purchase insurance, unlike the 
‘prohibitory’ financial punishment in Drexel Furniture.”163 In other 
words, the individual mandate sets a price that allows efficient breach 
(as do all liability rules), while the child labor tax set a prohibitively 
high penalty (as do all property rules).164 
An interesting area for future research is the relationship between 
Congress’ constitutional taxing power and the property- and liability-
rule distinction. This Article does not, however, further consider any 
constitutional questions. 
G. Liability Rules in Tax Law 
Liability rules in tax compensate for harm caused by violating a re-
quirement. There are three types of harm: direct fiscal harm in the form 
of lost tax revenues; indirect fiscal harm, such as when one taxpayer’s 
non-compliance encourages others to avoid tax; and non-fiscal harm to 
third parties or to non-tax policies.165 
Some liability rules in the tax code are imposed at normal income tax 
rates, which currently reach a maximum of 39.6% for individuals166 and 
35% for corporations.167 For example, if a public charity violates the re-
quirement that it be “operated exclusively for religious, charitable, sci-
entific,” or other enumerated purposes,168 it must pay unrelated business 
income tax169 (“UBIT”) at normal corporate income tax rates of up to 
 
162 Id.  
163 Id. at 2595–96. 
164 The Court also relied on the absence of criminal sanctions for failing to pay the indi-
vidual mandate payment. Id. at 2596. Criminal sanctions are property-rule remedies, so this 
absence underlines the liability-rule character of the individual mandate.  
165 Pigovian taxes aim to correct market failures such as negative externalities by taxing 
them. Britt Groosman, Pollution Tax, in 2 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 2500 
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Gees eds., 2000). Some liability rules for violating tax-
status requirements are Pigovian taxes.  
166 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-240, § 101(b)(1), 126 Stat. 2316 
(2013).  
167 See I.R.C. § 11 (2006).  
168 Id. § 501(c)(3).  
169 Id. § 511(a)(1), (a)(2)(A). The UBIT is also applied on qualified retirement plans in 
certain circumstances. Perdue, supra note 112, at ¶ 20.02.  
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35% on all income unrelated to its exempt purpose.170 If a university 
opens a parking lot open to the public or invests part of its endowment in 
a private equity fund,171 it generally must pay UBIT on the resulting in-
come. Or, if an art museum’s gift shop sells souvenirs unrelated to its art 
collection,172 it pays UBIT on the sales income. The UBIT compensates 
the government for the revenue that would be collected if the activity 
were carried on by a taxable corporation.173 Similarly, various REIT re-
quirements are protected by 35% liability rules.174 
An important category of liability rules imposed at normal tax rates 
applies to tax-free exchanges, such as corporate reorganizations,175 cor-
porate separations,176 and like-kind property exchanges.177 Tax-free ex-
changes are examples of tax statuses for transactions. All tax-free ex-
changes have a requirement that “solely” qualified property can be 
exchanged.178 But when taxpayers violate this requirement by also ex-
changing nonqualified property (colorfully called “boot”179), the transac-
tion does not lose its tax-free status. Instead, the taxpayer pays tax at 
normal tax rates on the value of the boot,180 which is a liability rule. 
 
170 See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 15, at 316–17 (discussing UBIT’s relation to the 
“operated exclusively for” exempt purposes requirement).  
171 Private equity funds tend to invest using pass-through entities that result in UBIT. See 
I.R.C. § 512(c)(1); Andrew W. Needham, Portfolio 735: Private Equity Funds ¶ VII.A.2 (2d 
ed. 2010).  
172 See Rev. Rul. 73-105, 1973-1 C.B. 264.  
173 Cf. supra note 10 (at some point too much unrelated business income leads to status-
loss).  
174 See I.R.C. § 856(c)(7)(C), (g)(5) (violations of asset-composition requirements); id. 
§ 857(b)(4) (dealing in foreclosure property); id. § 860E(e)(6)(A), (B)(i) (certain income 
from mortgage securitization structures).  
175 Id. §§ 354(a)(1), 368(a)(1).  
176 Id. § 355(a)(1).  
177 Id. § 1031(a).  
178 Id. § 354(a)(1) (“exchanged solely for stock or securities” (emphasis added)); id. 
§ 355(a)(1)(A) (requiring that distributing corporation distribute “solely stock or securities of 
a corporation . . . which it controls immediately before the distribution” (emphasis added)); 
id. § 1031(a)(1) (“if such property is exchanged solely for property of like kind” (emphasis 
added)). 
179 Richard A. Westin, WG&L Tax Dictionary 75–76 (2002–2003) (defining “boot” as “a 
colloquial name for property that is precluded from being transferred by one taxpayer to an-
other tax-free, yet is transferred as part of an otherwise tax-free exchange” (emphasis omit-
ted)). 
180 I.R.C. § 355(c) (for separations that are not reorganizations); id. § 356(a)(1) (for both 
reorganizations and separations); id. § 1031(b) (for like-kind exchanges). 
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Other liability rules are imposed at 100% rates,181 which make sense 
when violating the requirement is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
tax status. For example, to ensure that REITs invest primarily in real es-
tate, one requirement is that they receive 75% of their gross income 
from real-estate investments like rent or mortgage interest.182 But a REIT 
that falls below 75% does not lose its status; rather, it generally pays 
100% of all taxable income attributable to gross income that falls below 
the threshold.183 This compensates the government for a REIT’s failure 
to focus primarily on investing in real estate. 
Similarly, tax-exempt municipal bonds have the requirement that the 
borrowing government must not invest the borrowed money in higher-
yielding taxable investments like corporate bonds.184 Such “arbitrage”—
using the tax exemption to borrow low, then investing high, and pocket-
ing the difference—would be a way for the borrowing government to 
grab tax dollars properly headed to the federal Treasury.185 When the 
borrowing government violates this no-arbitrage requirement, the bonds 
do not lose their status. Rather, the borrowing government simply pays 
to the federal government 100% of the arbitrage income, thus returning 
the money.186 
There are a variety of liability rules in the tax code with other rates, 
such as various taxes set at 10%,187 25%,188 and 30%189 for requirement-
violations by certain tax-exempt organizations. Still other liability rules 
impose a flat $50,000.190 A promising area for future scholarship is im-
 
181 Variations in calculating damages to the payee are entirely consistent with a liability 
rule. For example, some of the nineteenth-century Mill Acts provided for a liability rule with 
damages for flooding property of 150% of fair-market value. See An Act for the Encour-
agement of Manufactures, ch. 20, § 3, 1868 N.H. Laws 152, 153, cited in Head v. Amoskeag 
Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 9 n.1 (1885).  
182 I.R.C. § 856(c)(3).  
183 Id. § 857(b)(5). Relief is possible if the violation is “due to reasonable cause and not 
due to willful neglect” and is properly disclosed. Id. § 856(c)(6). As discussed infra Section 
III.A, this is an example of a pliability rule.  
184 Id. §§ 103(b)(2), 148. 
185 See 1 Bittker & Lokken, supra note 107, at ¶ 15.4.1. 
186 I.R.C. § 148(f)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.148-3 (2011). 
187 I.R.C. § 4941(a) (tax on self-dealing); see also id. § 4944 (tax on foundation invest-
ments that jeopardize carrying out of exempt purposes). 
188 Id. § 4911(a) (tax on excess expenditures to influence legislation).  
189 Id. § 4942(a) (tax on failure to distribute income).  
190 E.g., id. § 856(g)(5) (certain REIT violations); id. § 4959 (501(c)(3) hospital viola-
tions). 
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proving the theoretical underpinnings and practical methods for deter-
mining compensatory liability-rule amounts in tax. 
II. CHOOSING BETWEEN PROPERTY AND LIABILITY RULES TO PROTECT 
TAX STATUSES 
The preceding Part demonstrated that tax-status requirements may be 
protected by either property or liability rules. This Part applies the rich 
property- and liability-rule literature to analyze the relative merits and 
best uses of each.191 Each of these considerations elucidates costs and 
benefits, so one consideration alone will rarely determine the best rule 
for a particular requirement. 
Congress currently makes the decision between liability rules and 
property rules in tax on a fairly ad hoc basis. Congress might look at 
perhaps two or three of the considerations raised by the broader proper-
ty- and liability-rule literature—but it certainly misses most of them. 
This is not surprising, as several of these considerations are not obvious 
and took decades to be fleshed out in the broader literature. 
This Part should be the first step towards Congress drawing on the 
considerations from the broader literature to draft better tax laws. And 
when Congress sets out to reform the tax code, it should use these con-
siderations to see whether it makes sense to move a requirement current-
ly protected by a property rule to a liability rule instead, or vice versa. 
The considerations in this Part will be useful whenever Congress drafts 
new tax laws or reforms the existing ones.  
A. Compliance Expenditures 
Search costs to determine whether doing something would violate 
someone else’s entitlement can be substantial. For example, a landowner 
who wants to build a new building may hire a surveyor to ensure that it 
will not encroach onto a neighbor’s land, or may hire a real-estate attor-
 
191 Professor David A. Weisbach, in an excellent article, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 860 (1999), notes that “[a] discontinuous law, a cliff, may have very different 
behavioral effects than a continuous law, although one cannot say which will be more effi-
cient without more information.” Id. at 873. This Article focuses on how to make such de-
terminations, as liability-rule remedies are a type of continuous law. By contrast, the contin-
uous laws discussed by Weisbach are not liability rules but instead property rules with 
continuously varying probabilities of being imposed, in that “[a] small change in facts will 
only change the probability a little, creating a continuous change in the law from an ex ante 
perspective.” Id. 
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ney to ensure that the building does not violate any easements.192 As an-
other example, a manufacturer considering a new product may want to 
hire engineers and patent attorneys to ensure that the product does not 
infringe on any of a competitor’s patents.193 These search costs can be 
quite substantial. Indeed, sometimes litigation is the only way to defini-
tively determine the scope of property rights.194 
Property rules create incentives for higher search-cost expenditures 
than liability rules do. Building on the work of Professor Thomas Mer-
rill,195 Professor Stewart Sterk has demonstrated mathematically “that, 
compared with a liability-rule regime, a property-rule regime creates ex-
cessive incentives to search even when search costs are high, the proba-
bility of encroachment is relatively low, and the likely harm to the prop-
erty owner is low.”196 The basic intuition is simple: Possible encroachers 
have an incentive to spend socially inefficient amounts on searching197 
to avoid even a small possibility of incurring a draconian property rule. 
Search costs tend to be low in situations with clear on/off rules, such 
as the boundary around a parcel of land.198 Partly as a result, land is of-
ten protected by property rules. By contrast, liability rules tend to be bet-
ter for situations with vague boundaries, as with a manufacturer who 
must determine whether its new product violates any of a competitor’s 
2,000 vaguely drafted patents.199 
There are search costs in tax law, where they are typically called 
compliance costs. These include expensive accountants and tax lawyers 
to determine whether contemplated transactions violate ambiguous re-
 
192 Sterk, supra note 27, at 1288.  
193 See Sterk, supra note 27, at 1297–99.  
194 Sterk, supra note 27, at 1325 (discussing Drulard v. Le Tourneau, 593 P.2d 1118 (Or. 
1979)); Pandora Media, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 49 (Sept. 2, 2011), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1230276/000119312511239281/d10q.htm (“Liti-
gation . . . may be necessary in the future to enforce our intellectual property rights . . . and 
to determine the validity and scope of the proprietary rights of others.”). 
195 E.g., Merrill, supra note 27.  
196 Sterk, supra note 27, at 1304.  
197 The degree of inefficiency created by a property rule is roughly proportional to the 
search costs to determine encroachment. Sterk, supra note 27, at 1318. 
198 See Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 
1075, 1091 (1997); Smith, Property, supra note 24, at 1753–54. 
199 Cf. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring and joined by three other Justices) (noting that uncertainty in legal boundaries of pa-
tents should be considered in deciding between injunction and damages to protect the pa-
tent).  
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quirements.200 They also include internal controls to ensure factual 
changes do not cause violations. For example, REITs retain tax counsel 
to determine whether potential investments will qualify under the vari-
ous asset and income tests, while also maintaining internal systems to 
monitor value and income fluctuations.201 State and local governments 
use written procedures and outside auditors to ensure that their bonds 
continue to be tax-exempt.202 And some churches are, as one commenta-
tor noted, “always looking over their shoulder, for fear that any political 
activity will place them in violation of the [Tax] Code and at risk of los-
ing their tax-exempt status.”203 Such constant self-monitoring wastes 
time. 
If a requirement is protected by a property rule, with potentially dra-
conian status-loss as the remedy, taxpayers rationally lavish money on 
compliance costs to avoid violating it. A liability rule, by contrast, leads 
to lower compliance costs. 
Compliance costs always weigh in favor of liability rules in tax. The 
only question is how much they weigh towards liability rules for a par-
ticular requirement. When the law around a requirement is clear and the 
relevant facts are fully within the taxpayer’s control, compliance costs 
are low and provide little advantage for liability rules over status-loss.204 
That situation is akin to the on/off clarity provided by land boundaries. 
But when the law is unclear or the relevant facts can fluctuate outside 
the taxpayer’s control, compliance costs are high, weighing towards lia-
bility rules.205 
 
200 Cf. Sterk, supra note 27, at 1297 (providing an example of real-property search cost of 
hiring a lawyer to ascertain the extent of an easement).  
201 For instance, one of the various REIT asset tests, I.R.C. § 856(c)(4)(B)(iii)(II) (2006), 
requires that to qualify as a REIT, “the trust [cannot] hold securities possessing more than 10 
percent of the total voting power of the outstanding securities of any one issuer.” I.R.S. Priv. 
Ltr. Rul. 9237022 (June 12, 1992) demonstrates how factual changes outside a REIT’s con-
trol can cause unwitting violations of this test.  
202 See Shamik Trivedi, Written Procedures Critical to Post-Issuance Compliance, Bond 
Attorneys Say, 133 Tax Notes 293 (Oct. 17, 2011).  
203 Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics and Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS Re-
strictions on the Political Activities of Religious Organizations, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 875, 899 
(2001).  
204 Cf. Sterk, supra note 27, at 1318 (explaining that search costs are less of an argument 
for jettisoning property rules when search costs are low).  
205 Cf. Smith, Property, supra note 24, at 1754 (noting that liability rules may be better for 
high-stakes borderline disputes). 
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Congress should identify the requirements currently protected by sta-
tus-loss that create particularly high compliance costs and move to lia-
bility rules. Such a move makes the economic “pie” bigger, while com-
pensating the government when violations happen. 
B. Encouraging Efficient Transactions 
Property rules can discourage taxpayers from engaging in some eco-
nomically efficient transactions that they would otherwise engage in if a 
liability rule were used. The following two Subsections illustrate the two 
basic circumstances where liability rules can encourage economically 
efficient transactions. 
1. Allowing Efficient Violations of Requirements by Setting a “Price” 
In contract law, liability-rule protection dominates, giving promisors 
incentives to intentionally breach contracts when doing so is economi-
cally efficient.206 Liability rules thus make the economic “pie” bigger, 
while ensuring that the promisee is compensated for the breach.207 Simi-
larly, using liability rules to protect tax-status requirements may make 
sense in the many instances when violating a requirement is economical-
ly efficient. Liability rules in tax make the economic “pie” bigger, while 
ensuring that the government is no worse off. 
The unrelated business income tax (UBIT) discussed earlier is a per-
fect example.208 Whenever a public charity’s activities violate the re-
quirement that it be “operated exclusively” for an exempt purpose,209 the 
UBIT collects the same tax revenues that would be generated if a for-
profit corporation had undertaken the activities. This liability rule allows 
public charities to participate in ventures that make the “pie” bigger by 
minimizing transaction costs or taking advantage of synergies with their 
exempt activities. For example, the UBIT allows university endowments 
to invest directly in business ventures resulting from faculty innovations, 
and it allows art-museum gift shops to sell non-art souvenirs.210 It allows 
 
206 See Ayres, supra note 7, at 12.  
207 Id. at 11–12.  
208 See supra notes 168–73.  
209 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).  
210 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.  
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senior centers to sell senior-friendly appliances211 and allows youth cen-
ters to offer miniature golf courses.212 
Such efficient breaches would generally not occur if the relevant re-
quirements were protected by property rules, which aim to deter any vio-
lation by setting damages much higher than the harm to the government. 
Congress should consider using a liability rule whenever breaching a re-
quirement can make the “pie” bigger. 
2. Preventing Ambiguity from Discouraging Efficient Transactions 
The previous Subsection observed that liability rules encourage effi-
cient breach of clear requirements. This Subsection argues that liability 
rules also encourage efficient transactions where it is unclear whether a 
transaction violates a requirement. 
Taxpayers will take an action that arguably violates a tax-status re-
quirement whenever the expected non-tax benefit213 exceeds the ex-
pected tax cost, which is the probability that the action violates a re-
quirement, multiplied by the penalty for violation. Status-loss is a high 
penalty, meaning that the expected tax cost of an action will be so high 
that few actions have sufficient non-tax benefit to be worthwhile under 
this cost-benefit analysis. The beneficial actions that taxpayers do not 
take because of these risks are deadweight losses to society. By contrast, 
a liability rule sets the penalty equal to the government’s harm, so the 
expected tax cost equals expected harm to the government. Thus, a lia-
bility rule causes taxpayers to properly balance their non-tax benefit 
against the expected harm to the government. 
A straightforward hypothetical illustrates this advantage of liability 
rules over property rules. Suppose a REIT expects to get $50 million in 
tax benefits from qualifying as a REIT over the next five years. (REIT 
status-loss generally remains effective for five years.214) The REIT is 
considering an economically efficient asset sale that would generate $1 
 
211 Rev. Rul. 81-62, 1981-1 C.B. 355 (providing an example where a senior-citizen center 
had UBIT on income from selling heavy-duty appliances, which “generally spares aged per-
sons only an infrequent inconvenience”).  
212 Rev. Rul. 79-361, 1979-2 C.B. 237 (providing an example where a charitable organiza-
tion providing for the welfare of young people was subject to UBIT on income from operat-
ing a miniature golf course).  
213 Of course there may be non-tax costs as well. For simplicity, non-tax costs are assumed 
to have already been subtracted from non-tax benefits.  
214 I.R.C. § 856(g)(3). 
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million in profit, but which has a 20% chance215 of being a prohibited 
transaction.216 If prohibited transactions resulted in status-loss, the ex-
pected tax cost of the sale would be $10 million (that is, 20% of $50 mil-
lion), vastly exceeding the $1 million in benefit. The economically effi-
cient sale will not occur. 
But, in actual fact, REIT prohibited transactions incur a liability rule, 
specifically a 100% excise tax on the net income from the prohibited 
transaction.217 The expected tax cost is therefore only $200,000 (that is, 
20% of $1 million). Because this is less than the $1 million in benefits 
from the sale, the sale will occur, to society’s benefit. In this way, when-
ever a requirement potentially generates ambiguity, moving from status-
loss to a liability rule prevents the ambiguity from generating a 
deadweight loss. This provides another reason for Congress to move to 
liability rules for ambiguous requirements.218 
The detriment from using status-loss to protect ambiguous require-
ments is not limited to purely economic matters. Samuel Brunson has 
observed that the ambiguous no-political-participation requirement—
which is protected by status-loss—often causes a charity to “restrict its 
behavior more than the tax law requires, and miss the chance to do some 
things that are permissible and would further its exempt purpose.”219 
Such missed chances would be minimized by instead using a liability 
rule. 
C. Deterrence 
Property rules are, by definition, intended to deter violations by set-
ting a high penalty.220 This Section argues—counterintuitively—that sta-
tus-loss may actually be less effective in deterring violations than a lia-
bility rule in many circumstances. Status-loss is often a draconian 
remedy, and the IRS hesitates to impose it. 
 
215 See Weisbach, supra note 191, at 873 (stating that when contemplating a transaction, 
“the taxpayer only knows probabilities”).  
216 See I.R.C. § 857(b)(6). Whether a sale is a prohibited transaction depends on the highly 
ambiguous determination of whether the property being sold is “inventory.” See id. § 1221. 
217 Id. § 857(b)(6)(A).  
218 See supra Section II.A (discussing how liability rules substantially reduce compliance 
costs for ambiguous requirements).  
219 Samuel D. Brunson, Reigning in Charities: Using an Intermediate Penalty to Enforce 
the Campaigning Prohibition, 8 Pitt. Tax Rev. 125, 155 (2011).  
220 See Ayres, supra note 7, at 13 (“Property rules protect entitlements by trying to deter 
others from taking.”); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092.  
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Consider the All Saints Church investigation. Two days before the 
2004 presidential election, the sermon delivered at All Saints was “If Je-
sus Debated Senator Kerry and President Bush,” which critiqued Presi-
dent Bush for the war in Iraq and inaction on poverty.221 The next day, 
the Los Angeles Times ran a front-page story discussing the sermon,222 
and the IRS soon issued a summons requesting information relevant to 
the sermon and All Saints Church’s tax-exempt status as a public chari-
ty.223 The church refused even to comply with the summons,224 and the 
IRS ultimately imposed no remedy at all.225 
The All Saints Church investigation neatly exemplifies the problems 
of protecting a requirement solely with status-loss. The IRS has taken 
away a church’s status only once,226 with a church that ran full-page 
newspaper ads in 1992 specifically advocating Bill Clinton’s defeat.227 
In a less egregious case, such as the sermon at All Saints Church, taking 
away public charity status would be a disproportionate remedy. Status-
loss would also bring public-relations and political costs to the IRS vast-
ly outweighing any benefit from increased tax revenue. The IRS’s mere 
investigation provoked a stern letter to the IRS from the congressman 
representing All Saints Church’s district.228 The letter suggested a con-
 
221 George F. Regas, Rector Emeritus, All Saints Church, If Jesus Debated Senator Kerry 
and President Bush, Tax Notes Today, Oct. 31, 2004, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 215-27.  
222 Josh Getlin, The Race for the White House: Pulpits Ring with Election Messages, L.A. 
Times, Nov. 1, 2004, at A1.  
223 Summons from Internal Revenue Service, Tax Exempt and Government Entities Divi-
sion, to All Saints Church, Tax Notes Today, June 9, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 228-16.  
224 Stephanie Strom, I.R.S. Inquiry Into Sermon Is Challenged by Church, N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 22, 2006, at A15. This forced the IRS either to request a court to enforce the summons, 
or to abandon the case.  
225 Letter from Marsha A. Ramirez, Director, Exempt Organization Examinations, to Mar-
cus S. Owens, Attorney for All Saints Tax Notes Today, Sept. 10, 2007, LEXIS, 2007 TNT 
186-24.  
226 Benjamin Vaughn, Note, The High Cost of Free Exercise: All Saints, The Service, and 
Section 501(c)(3), 61 Tax Law. 981, 993 (2008); see IRS, 2006 Political Activities Compli-
ance Initiative at 5 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/2006paci_report_5-
30-07.pdf (suggesting zero churches had final or proposed status-revocations).  
227 Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding the IRS 
revocation of the church’s tax exempt status; rejecting numerous First Amendment and statu-
tory arguments), aff’g, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 16 (D.D.C. 1999); cf. Vaughn E. James, Reaping 
Where They Have Not Sowed: Have American Churches Failed to Satisfy the Requirements 
for the Religious Tax Exemption?, 43 Cath. Law. 29, 47 (2004) (“[T]he Service and the 
courts have not stringently enforced [section 501(c)(3)’s lobbying and campaigning] limita-
tions. . . .”).  
228 See Letter of Rep. Adam B. Schiff to Mark W. Everson, Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, and John W. Snow, Secretary of the Treasury (Nov. 15, 2005), in Summons from 
BLAIR-STANEK_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 9/24/2013 5:34 PM 
1202 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 99:1169 
gressional inquiry might be warranted.229 Actually imposing status-loss 
on All Saints would have created severe headaches for the IRS. 
This problem with protecting a requirement solely with status-loss is 
hardly limited to churches, as shown by the example of Care Investment 
Trust, a REIT that had its initial public offering (IPO) in 2007.230 One of 
the requirements for REIT qualification is having shares that are “trans-
ferable.”231 But Care Investment Trust had its IPO with over 36% of its 
shares subject to lock-up agreements,232 meaning the REIT failed the 
“transferable” requirement.233 
This requirement—just like the requirement that public charities not 
intervene in politics—is protected only by status-loss. The IRS could 
strip the REIT of its status or do nothing.234 The IRS did nothing, and 
Care Investment Trust suffered no consequences from its blatant viola-
tion. Taking away the status of a publicly traded REIT such as Care In-
vestment Trust would severely impact its shareholders, many (or all) of 
whom would contact their congressperson. The status-loss would make 
the financial press. And the National Association of Real Estate Invest-
 
Internal Revenue Service, Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division, to All Saints 
Church, Tax Notes Today, June 9, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 226-32.  
229 Id.  
230 See Care Investment Trust Inc., Prospectus, SEC Registration No. 333-141634 (June 
22, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1393726/00009501360
7004365/file1.htm [hereinafter “CIT Prospectus”].  
231 I.R.C. § 856(a)(2) (2006) (requiring “the beneficial ownership of which is evidenced by 
transferable shares, or by transferable certificates of beneficial interest”).  
232 CIT Prospectus, supra note 230, at cover page (“CIT Group, through our Manager and 
CIT Holding, will own approximately 36.1% of our outstanding common stock.”); id. at 13 
(chart of ownership); id. at 110 (describing the extremely complete lock-up that the CIT 
Group agreed to with the underwriters to prevent transferability).  
233 Case law and IRS guidance had interpreted the “transferable” requirement leniently, to 
allow some small percentage of the stock to be locked up for purposes like employee stock 
options and underwriting. Specifically, the transferable requirement was leniently interpreted 
to require that only “substantially all” of the stock be transferable. Zuckman v. United States, 
524 F.2d 729, 742 (Ct. Cl. 1975); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9534022 (May 31, 1995) (stating “a 
small percentage of the stock” was not transferable); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9747034 (Aug. 25, 
1997) (“a small percentage of the stock”); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9613018 (Dec. 27, 1995); 
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9440026 (July 11, 1994) (“a small percentage of the stock”). “Substan-
tially all” generally means 90%, but may mean as little as 80% or 70% in unusual situations. 
See Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 504. But Care Investment Trust fell very far short of any 
of these, with only 63.9% of its shares being transferable. See supra note 232.  
234 The IRS does have the power to impose a $50,000 fine on Care Investment Trust if the 
violation is “due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect.” I.R.C. § 856(g)(5). This 
fine is negligible compared to the IPO’s $225 million value. Moreover, it is doubtful that 
such a clear violation would be “due to reasonable cause.”  
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ment Trusts (NAREIT), the REIT trade organization,235 would bring po-
litical pressure on the IRS to reverse itself. 
1. Model of IRS Utility 
This Subsection builds a simple model of the IRS’s utility that at-
tempts to explain the IRS’s behavior in cases such as All Saints Church 
and Care Investment Trust. The utility functions used in this model are 
ultimately only examples, but they demonstrate why status-loss may of-
ten provide a less effective deterrent than a liability rule. 
Assume that the taxpayer, who has violated a requirement, derives to-
tal value of $200 from the tax status.236 During negotiations on the prop-
er remedy for the violation, there is a range of settlement amounts the 
taxpayer could reach with the IRS—anywhere from $0 up to $200. If the 
IRS demanded $200 or more, the taxpayer would rationally abandon the 
status. In other words, $200 is the precise equivalent to the taxpayer of 
status-loss. 
Three factors contribute to the IRS’s utility (specifically, the utility of 
IRS employees, such as agents, attorneys, and supervisors) as a function 
of the amount the IRS requires the taxpayer to pay in order to retain its 
status: utility R from collecting the additional revenue; utility P corre-
sponding to the IRS employees’ sense of the proportionality of the rem-
edy to the gravity of the violation; and utility C consisting of pressure 
from Congress, executive-branch political appointees, and the media 




235 NAREIT frequently lobbies the IRS regarding REIT tax qualification matters. See, e.g., 
NAREIT, 2011–2012 Guidance Priority List Recommendations, Tax Notes Today, May 26, 
2011, LEXIS, 2011 TNT 109-25; Letter from NAREIT to Treasury and IRS, Tax Notes To-
day, Feb. 3, 2011, LEXIS, 2011 TNT 38-21.  
236 Total value includes both direct and indirect tax benefits. For example, in the case of a 
public charity, total value from the status would include: (1) direct financial benefits from 
not paying income taxes; plus (2) the donations it receives because donors can deduct dona-
tions from their own tax returns; plus (3) intangible benefits from the government’s recogni-
tion of not having a profit motive.  
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R, for revenue, is simple. The IRS is a revenue-collection agency, and 
increased revenue generates increased utility.237 
P takes the shape it does because IRS employees, like all humans, 
have a natural sense of proportionality.238 When a taxpayer who violates 
 
237 Potentially R would reflect declining marginal utility from each additional dollar col-
lected. But the IRS collects from such a vast number of taxpayers that this decline is irrele-
vant to any individual taxpayer. Hence R can be assumed to be a straight line.  
238 See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Prob-
lem, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 607, 612 fig.2 (2000) (reflecting a nearly identical function Pi repre-
senting utility as a function of severity of remedy); id. at 612 n.5 (gathering citations for ex-
perimental research from social sciences justifying the notion that humans have an intuitive 
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a requirement pays only $0, this result is inequitable, undermines com-
pliance, and hence gives the IRS negative utility. As the remedy increas-
es, the IRS’s utility becomes positive and increases until it reaches its 
peak at the remedy that the IRS views as proportional to the violation. 
This peak will be further to the right for graver violations, and further to 
the left for more minor violations. Beyond this peak, higher remedies 
become increasingly disproportionate, decreasing IRS utility, which 
eventually becomes negative.239 By the time the remedy reaches $200 
(the equivalent of status-loss), utility is strongly negative. Status-loss is 
tax law’s equivalent of a forfeiture, which is generally recognized as be-
ing abhorrent or, at a minimum, highly distasteful.240 Status-loss is par-
ticularly draconian when imposed for minor violations.241 
Several factors backstop the IRS’s desire for proportionality. Many 
IRS employees plan to eventually move to law or accounting firms, giv-
ing an incentive to avoid reputations for being unduly harsh to taxpayers 
(for example, “when A was at IRS she was responsible for actually re-
voking a REIT’s status,” or “B extracted a massive settlement from a 
pension when he was at IRS”). Additionally, the harsher the penalty the 
IRS is seeking, the greater the likelihood that a judge or jury242 will find 
wiggle room to avoid imposing any penalty at all,243 undermining tax 
 
239 One practitioner has observed: 
[IRS District] Counsel’s position is that the importance of litigation to the administra-
tion of the tax law is not measured by the amount of taxes collected through litigation, 
but rather by the effect that a position taken by the IRS in litigation has on the shape 
and development of the tax law. Accordingly, it is Counsel’s position that the position 
taken in a case must be one that is reasonable on the facts in the case and one which 
makes the maximum contribution to a sound tax system.  
Charles W. Hall, IRS Controversies at Audit and Beyond, William & Mary Annual Tax Con-
ference Paper 210, at 29 (Dec. 1, 1990), available at http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/tax/210. 
240 People v. Ranger Ins. Co., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 765 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (“Because the 
law abhors forfeitures, these statutes are to be strictly construed . . . .”); Fifty States Mgmt. 
Co. v. Pioneer Auto Parks, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 113, 116 (1979) (“[E]quity abhors forfeitures.”).  
241 Perdue, supra note 112, ¶ 19.02[2][a] (stating “in view of the complexities of the quali-
fication rules, disqualification often seemed a draconian response to many relatively minor 
violations” (emphasis added)).  
242 Tax refund suits brought in district court may be tried to a jury. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (cit-
ing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1)) (2006); see also Saltzman, supra note 147, ¶ 1.05[2][a].  
243 See, e.g., Cherry-Burrell Corp. v. United States, 367 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1966) 
(Blackmun, J.) (forgiving clear violation of requirement based on statute’s “purpose”). Pro-
fessor Kontorovich notes a similar trend in constitutional law, where only property-rule rem-
edies are typically available to judges to vindicate constitutional rights. Kontorovich, supra 
note 3, at 780. In many instances where there has been a constitutional violation but where a 
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administration and creating IRS-unfavorable precedent. For example, a 
determined court certainly would have had wiggle room to avoid finding 
that the All Saints Church sermon violated the ambiguous no-political-
participation requirement.244 
C, the third of the three factors in this model, reflects the congression-
al, political-appointee, and media pressure that comes with increasingly 
harsh remedies.245 Although no empirical data exists on requirement vio-
lations in particular, there have been studies testing whether Congress 
and executive-branch political appointees impact IRS behavior on easy-
to-measure audit rates.246 These studies demonstrate that audit rates are 
lower in districts of members of the Senate and House committees that 
oversee the IRS, as well as in presidential-election swing states. Con-
gresspersons regularly intervene with the IRS on behalf of constituents 
and donors, and some congresspersons even advertise on their websites 
that they can help constituents who have “problems” with the IRS.247 A 
taxpayer at risk of status-loss or of paying a disproportionately large set-
tlement to the IRS would be well advised to contact their congressper-
son. Recall that the congressperson representing All Saints Church’s dis-
trict wrote a stern letter to the IRS.248 The media also plays a role: Past 
media accounts of IRS “horror stories” have led to congressional hear-
 
property-rule remedy would be too drastic, Kontorovich observes that courts have contorted 
themselves to avoid finding a constitutional violation. Id. at 780–86. 
244 See Letter from All Saints Church’s Attorney to IRS, Tax Notes Today, Oct. 11, 2005 
LEXIS 2005 TNT 215-13 (summarizing legal arguments).  
245 Cf. Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Proce-
dural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 Yale L.J. 1165, 1167 (1993) 
(noting that the IRS and Treasury are not immune from political pressures or interest group 
influence). 
246 William J. Hunter & Michael A. Nelson, Tax Enforcement: A Public Choice Perspec-
tive, 82 Pub. Choice 53, 54 (1995); Marilyn Young et al. The Political Economy of the IRS, 
13 Econ. & Pol. 201, 202 (2001); see also Eugenia Froedge Toma & Mark Toma, A Con-
gressional Control Model of Treasury Revenue Collection, 53 S. Econ. J. 141, 149 (1986) 
(using time series data to demonstrate that tax-collection appropriations move in opposite 
directions from higher marginal tax rates).  
247 Young et al., supra note 246, at 204. An interesting question, well outside the scope of 
this Article, is the degree to which the IRS and Congress engage in Coasean bargaining over 
a particular taxpayer’s treatment. For example, in return for not imposing status-loss on a 
favored donor to a Member of the House Ways & Means Committee, the IRS might get a 
desired tweak to the tax code. A further interesting question is whether status-loss or liability 
rules better facilitate Coasean bargaining (if any) between the IRS and Congress.  
248 Letter of Rep. Adam B. Schiff, supra note 228.  
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ings and legislation aimed to curtail IRS powers and practices.249 As a 
result, C, the utility from political and media harm generally250 starts at 
zero for a $0 penalty, and goes down from there. The closer the penalty 
gets to status-loss, the greater the grist for complaints to congresspersons 
and the media, causing C to decline more rapidly.251 
The utility functions R (revenue), P (proportionality), and C (political 
and media pressure) in Figure 1 are, as noted earlier, just examples. 
Adding all three together yields an example of the IRS’s total utility 
function, depicted below in Figure 2: 
 




249 See, e.g., Creighton R. Meland, Jr., Note, Omnibus Taxpayers’ Bill of Rights Act: Tax-
payers’ Remedy or Political Placebo?, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1787, 1787–88 (1988) (contending 
that taxpayer horror stories led to the passage of IRS-restraining legislation).  
250 The C curve depicted here is an example intended to reflect most cases, and could be 
markedly different. For example, the C curve might even be increasing if Congress or the 
media were calling for the IRS to punish a perceived abuse.  
251 Additionally, the IRS often will not know the precise value of the tax status to the tax-
payer (assumed here to be $200), which is the penalty at which the taxpayer rationally aban-
dons the status. This uncertainty makes C decline even faster as it approaches the approxi-
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This figure demonstrates graphically why, in many cases, including 
All Saints Church and Care Investment Trust, status-loss is less effective 
in deterring a violation than a liability rule. Due to the downward slope 
in P (proportionality) and C (political and media pressure), the IRS’s 
utility is higher at $0 (no remedy) than at $200 (which is equivalent to 
status-loss). In these circumstances, the threat of status-loss is not credi-
ble and fails to deter. 
When a tax status is protected solely by a property rule, the IRS faces 
an unpleasant dilemma if it cannot reach a settlement with the taxpayer: 
It can let the violation go entirely unpunished, or it can take away the 
status. In such situations, a leading treatise likens the IRS to “a prosecu-
tor who can win conviction only by persuading a jury to impose the 
death penalty; the prosecutor is reluctant to prosecute where the penalty 
is obviously excessive.”252 When the IRS’s only option is status-loss, it 
often imposes no remedy at all.253 
By contrast, liability rules require the taxpayer to compensate the 
government for harm from the violation. As a result, liability-rule penal-
ties are proportional to the harm and are at or near the peak of P (the 
proportionality utility curve). Moreover, it is hard for politicians or the 
media to get worked up about a penalty that merely compensates the 
government, meaning C is not terribly negative. All told, a liability rule 
will generally be at or close to the amount that maximizes the IRS’s total 
utility, making it quite credible that the IRS will impose the liability rule 
on a taxpayer who violates a requirement. In this way, liability rules may 
provide some deterrence while status-loss provides none. 
Would All Saints Church and Care Investment Trust have been as 
cavalier if the requirements at issue had been protected by liability 
rules? Probably not. 
Status-loss is even less credible when it would harm third parties.254 
Imposing status-loss on a university would harm students by reducing 
 
252 Bittker & Lokken, supra note 107, ¶ 15.1 (emphasis added) (discussing the result of 
violating tax-exempt municipal bond requirements protected solely by status-loss).  
253 In some cases, the IRS may be willing to suffer the lower utility of status-loss with re-
spect to one taxpayer if that increases utility across all taxpayers. For example, by taking 
away one taxpayer’s status, the IRS may find that it has credibility to negotiate intermediate 
penalties that maximize its utility with the next 100 taxpayers. See, e.g., Fazi v. Comm’r, 
102 T.C. 695, 706 (1994) (ruling that a qualified retirement plan lost its status).  
254 Courts have long considered third parties’ interests in deciding between property rules 
and liability rules. For example, in Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., cited 
in Calabresi and Melamed’s path-breaking article, supra note 1, at 1120 n.60, the owners of 
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the university’s economic resources. Status-loss for a homeless shelter 
would reduce resources available to help the homeless. Additionally, 
donors would lose the deductibility of their donations.255 Status-loss for 
a REIT would harm its shareholders. Status-loss for a retirement plan 
diminishes workers’ retirement assets and leads them to have higher cur-
rent tax bills.256 Anecdotal evidence confirms that the IRS avoids status-
loss that harms third parties. For example, the head IRS official in 
charge of auditing qualified retirement plans recently told the audience 
at an ABA event that the IRS is “very passionate about keeping qualified 
plans qualified.”257 
When third parties would be harmed, P (proportionality utility) is 
even more negative at the point of status-loss, because the third parties 
exacerbate the lack of proportionality. Similarly, C (political and media 
pressure) is even more negative as the harmed third parties complain to 
their congresspersons and the media. As a result, when status-loss harms 
third parties, the IRS’s total utility from imposing status-loss is even 
more negative, and status-loss is even less credible as a deterrent. 
2. Contrasted with Nuisance Dispute 
How is it that status-loss can ever deter violations less than a liability 
rule? The answer lies in the IRS’s utility curve compared to a normal 
private litigant’s utility curve. 
Consider the nuisance scenario where a factory’s pollution harms a 
neighboring resident. Assume that the factory’s utility from the polluting 
activity is $200, while the neighbor’s utility in having pollution-free air 
is only $50. Figure 3 below illustrates the neighbor’s utility on the verti-
cal axis, as a function of the factory’s damages (either court ordered or 
in a settlement) on the horizontal axis. Just like Figure 2 earlier, this fig-
ure graphs utility as a function of amount paid. But the function’s shape 
is very different. 
 
land worth $1,000 sought an injunction (property-rule protection) against a mining operation 
that was a nuisance but employed over a thousand workers and brought substantial revenue 
to the locality. 83 S.W. 658, 660 (Tenn. 1904). But the court awarded only damages (a liabil-
ity rule), relying heavily on the interests of the third parties that would be affected. Id. at 666 
(asking rhetorically whether the court should issue an injunction that would “destroy half of 
the taxable values of a county, and drive more than 10,000 people from their homes”).  
255 I.R.C. § 170 (2006).  
256 See generally Perdue, supra note 112, ¶ 19.02.  
257 Matthew Dalton & Shamik Trivedi, Employee Plan Compliance Remains in IRS 
Sights, Official Says, 132 Tax Notes 797, 798 (Aug. 22, 2011). 
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Figure 3: Nuisance 
 
The higher the damages paid to the neighbor, the more utility the 
neighbor receives.258 In other words, an extra dollar from the factory al-
ways increases the neighbor’s utility. If the neighbor can obtain an in-
junction or disgorgement of the factory’s profits ($200), the neighbor 
will rationally do so. 
By contrast, back in Figure 2, the IRS’s utility as a function of the 
amount paid by the taxpayer increases, reaches a maximum, and then 
decreases. The IRS has considerations other than just maximizing reve-
nue, including political and media pressure and proportionality. 
 
258 The slight curve in the utility function in Figure 3 reflects the diminishing marginal 
utility of money to the resident. The degree of decline in marginal utility varies from person 
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3. Feedback from Enforcement or Non-Enforcement 
Professor Dan Kahan notes that when decision makers see a particular 
rule being enforced by other decision makers, they are more likely to en-
force it themselves.259 Conversely, when decision makers see a rule not 
being enforced, they are less likely to enforce it themselves.260 This ex-
plains why remedies seen as draconian (which he calls “hard shoves”) 
are not enforced: Decision makers shy away from enforcing the rule, 
which further discourages other decision makers from enforcing it.261 By 
contrast, remedies only slightly above a proportionate response (which 
he calls “gentle nudges”) are more likely to be enforced, allowing a gen-
eral increase in enforcement over time. Examples of areas where “gentle 
nudges” successfully increased enforcement over time include antismok-
ing regulations262 and sexual harassment.263 
Kahan’s basic insight likely applies to IRS employees as well. When 
IRS employees see their colleagues imposing no remedy for violations 
where the only remedy is status-loss, they may become more likely to do 
the same. Status-loss is a “hard shove” towards compliance,264 and often 
fails to promote compliance because IRS employees see it as too draco-
nian. 
D. Improving Taxpayer-IRS Negotiation 
When the IRS audits a taxpayer and discovers a gray area, the result 
in most cases is a settlement for some percentage of the potential taxes 
at stake.265 This Section considers how liability rules can facilitate equi-
table settlements after violations of tax-status requirements have oc-
curred. 
 
259 Kahan, supra note 238, at 613. 
260 Id. 
261 See id. at 616–17. 
262 Id. at 625–28. 
263 Id. at 634–40. 
264 Professor Samuel D. Brunson has observed that status-loss as a remedy for the no-
campaigning requirement for public charities is a “hard shove.” Brunson, supra note 219, at 
152. In its place, Brunson forcefully advocates an “intermediate penalty that gently nudges” 
public charities towards compliance. Id. at 169; see also id. at 159–68. This “intermediate 
penalty” is a liability-rule remedy, although Brunson does not identify it as such.  
265 Saltzman, supra note 147, ¶ 9.01 (“Appeals officers negotiate and in about 85 to 90 
percent of the cases settle with taxpayers.”); id. ¶¶ 9.07–9.09.  
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1. Encouraging Settlements to Happen 
Scholars have identified numerous reasons why liability rules may 
encourage negotiated solutions better than property rules, which exacer-
bate the problems created by “close-mouthed, pokerfaced, strategically 
bargaining” parties.266 Many of liability rules’ negotiation benefits come 
from providing an intermediate value as a starting point for negotiation, 
thereby curtailing strategic bargaining and transaction costs. These bene-
fits apply in tax law. 
But the considerations (discussed in Section II.C above) that can 
make status-loss fail to deter violations from happening in the first place 
also worsen the scope for taxpayers to strategically bargain after the vio-
lation has occurred. The IRS’s hesitation to impose status-loss allows a 
taxpayer to “play chicken”267 with the IRS by walking away from its last 
offer and daring the IRS to impose status-loss—or impose no remedy at 
all. 
By contrast, liability rules are more proportionate and generate less 
political or media blowback. The IRS rarely hesitates to impose them. 
Protecting requirements with liability rules severely constrains taxpay-
ers’ ability to “play chicken” or otherwise bargain strategically. 
2. More Consistent and Equitable Settlements 
When status-loss is the only remedy and negotiations do succeed in 
producing a settlement, similarly situated taxpayers may get much dif-
ferent settlements. Different taxpayers will have different IRS employ-
ees handling their cases. Some IRS employees will be much better nego-
tiators than others, capturing much different portions of the wide 
negotiating range between $0 and status-loss. Moreover, different IRS 
employees may have different concepts of a proportional remedy,268 
leading to different negotiating postures and different settlements. 
 
266 Rose, supra note 4, at 2184; see also Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 
273, 278 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (holding that property rules can “create[] a huge bar-
gaining range” and “given such a bargaining range, [negotiations] might well be protracted 
and costly”); Ayres, supra note 7, at chs. 9 & 10; Ayres & Talley, supra note 24, at 1032–33.  
267 Cf. Ayres & Madison, supra note 136, at 62 (“By allowing the defendant to credibly 
threaten inefficient performance, disgorgement remedies may allow the defendant to bargain 
to pay substantially less.”). The fundamental differences between the IRS and the parties 
discussed in Ayres & Madison are discussed infra note 347.  
268 The most proportional remedy is the peak of the utility curve P discussed above in Sub-
section II.C.1. 
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Perhaps most troublingly, IRS employee negotiating postures will al-
so be influenced by the political and media pressure that a taxpayer (and 
third parties like a REIT’s shareholders or a church’s parishioners) can 
bring to bear on the IRS.269 As a result, wealthy and well-connected tax-
payers will, on average, be able to negotiate more favorable settlements. 
A liability-rule formula is set ex ante, before taxpayers know whether 
they will violate the requirement. This minimizes the opportunity for the 
wealthy and well connected to influence the formula through lobbying 
or public relations.270 By contrast, when the negotiations are left wide-
open by protecting a requirement with status-loss, the wealthy and well-
connected can bring their political and media pressure to bear ex post to 
ensure the IRS negotiates a more lenient settlement. Liability rules thus 
minimize the role that a particular taxpayer’s political or media influ-
ence plays in the settlement amount. 
By having universal application, liability rules also minimize the im-
pact that individual IRS employees’ senses of proportionality have on 
the settlement. And, because they narrow the bargaining range, and be-
cause the IRS rarely hesitates to impose them, liability rules also mini-
mize the impact of individual IRS employees’ negotiating skill. In sum, 
Congress should recognize that liability rules lead to more consistent, 
fairer settlements than status-loss. 
E. Biased Liability Amounts 
Scholars have recognized that the benefits of liability rules dissipate if 
liability amounts are biased, being on average too high or too low.271 
Professor Henry Smith has observed that if liability rules are systemati-
cally set too low, then entitlements will be violated opportunistically 
even when doing so is economically inefficient.272 
This same problem exists in tax law. As Professor David Weisbach 
has noted more generally, “Uncommon transactions that are taxed inap-
propriately become common as taxpayers discover how to take ad-
 
269 Such pressure corresponds to the utility curve C discussed above in Subsection II.C.1. 
The shape of C influences the shape of the IRS’s total utility curve, which in turn determines 
the IRS’s negotiating posture.  
270 Cf. Ayres, Optional Law, supra note 7, at 199 (arguing that institutional considerations 
such as greater trust for different decision makers may influence the decision between prop-
erty and liability rules).  
271 See, e.g., id. at 197; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 730–32.  
272 Smith, Property, supra note 24, at 1743.  
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vantage of them.”273 If the liability-rule amount is set below the level of 
harm the violation causes, then taxpayers may inefficiently violate the 
requirement through tax planning or negligence. 
For example, the tax code imposes a flat $50,000 addition to tax for 
certain REIT violations, regardless of harm to the Treasury or tax ad-
ministration.274 The average publicly traded REIT has a market capitali-
zation of over $2.5 billion,275 meaning that this liability rule is almost 
certainly biased too low. 
The possibility of bias in liability rules should weigh in favor of sta-
tus-loss whenever Congress cannot be confident that the liability-rule 
formula is not biased too low. When liability rules are used, the formulas 
need to be carefully crafted. As a backstop, when Congress provides for 
liability rules, it should consider giving the IRS express rulemaking au-
thority to fix any biases that emerge in the formulas.276 
F. Calculation Costs 
Scholars have observed that liability rules entail calculation costs (al-
so called “assessment costs”) that property rules do not, thus weighing in 
favor of property rules.277 For example, using a liability rule to protect 
residents’ entitlement to unpolluted air requires a court to calculate the 
harm caused by pollution. Using a liability rule to remedy the loss of 
someone’s arm in a car crash requires calculating the value of the arm 
and the time spent recuperating. Such calculations often involve costly 
expert testimony, attorney time, juror time, and court time, all of which 
are calculation costs. By contrast, an injunction requires little or no cal-
culation costs. 
In tax law as well, calculation costs can weigh against liability rules. 
Taxpayers, potentially the IRS, and even courts must calculate liability-
rule amounts. As a closely related matter, putting liability-rule formulas 
into tax law requires making the tax code or Treasury regulations longer 
 
273 Weisbach, supra note 191, at 869. 
274 I.R.C. § 856(g)(5) (2006). The legislative history does not indicate why a flat fine was 
chosen. H.R. Rep. No. 108-755 (2004) (Conf. Rep.). 
275 See NAREIT, supra note 95, at 3. 
276 The “Rule 6” option discussed infra Section III.E and anti-abuse pliability rule dis-
cussed infra Section III.A can also act as backstops, allowing the IRS to threaten status-loss 
in place of biased liability rules. 
277 Krier & Schwab, supra note 26, at 457–59; Smith, Property, supra note 24, at 1720. But 
see Ayres, supra note 7, at 189 (responding to Krier & Schwab’s assessment costs criticism 
of liability rules). 
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and more complex. Such concerns weigh towards status-loss instead of 
liability rules. 
But tax law also provides unique opportunities for minimizing calcu-
lation costs, because liability-rule tax formulas can be based entirely on 
variables already quantified for accounting or tax purposes.278 For ex-
ample, one REIT requirement is that a REIT must have at least 100 
shareholders.279 This requirement is currently protected by status-loss. 
But a liability rule could be set to 1% of gross income for each share-
holder below 100. A REIT with only 99 shareholders would thus pay 
1% of its gross income. A REIT with only 98 shareholders would pay 
2% of its gross income, and so on. Once the violation of the requirement 
is known, computing the liability amount is straightforward. 
Tax is full of opportunities for similar easily calculated liability-rule 
formulas.280 In the broader property and liability rule debate, Professors 
Kaplow and Shavell have noted that using such formulas to determine 
liability amounts (provided they are unbiased) harnesses many of the 
benefits of liability rules, while minimizing calculation costs.281 
By contrast, it would be very difficult to craft a universally applicable 
formula for calculating the harm from polluted air or from losing an 
arm. Even if lawmakers could agree on such a formula, few of the inputs 
would already be quantified. In this way, tax law may provide opportu-
nities to minimize liability-rule calculation costs not present in other ar-
eas of law.282 
 
278 Cf. Brunson, supra note 219, at 159-62 (proposing a penalty formula for public chari-
ties’ political participation that involves several inputs that would not be previously calculat-
ed, thus failing to take advantage of tax law’s potential calculation-cost advantages).  
279 I.R.C. § 856(a)(5).  
280 As an analogous example, consider the requirement for S-corporation status that no 
shareholders be nonresident aliens. Id. § 1361(b)(1)(C). If a shareholder accidentally be-
comes a nonresident alien, the current remedy is status-loss, which is disastrous for all 
shareholders. See id. § 1361(b)(3)(C) & (D). But a liability rule could simply impose a 100% 
tax on the foreign shareholder’s pro-rata share of earnings, putting the burden on the taxpay-
er who is the lowest-cost avoider of the violation.  
281 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 732.  
282 Tax law avoids calculation costs in additional ways. In many non-tax areas, there are 
multiple entitlement holders, such as when a polluting factory harms thousands of neighbor-
ing residents. Splitting up liability-rule amounts between multiple claimants can entail sub-
stantial calculation costs. By contrast, tax law has only one entitlement holder (the govern-
ment) and thus avoids such calculation costs.  
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Counterintuitively, in some instances status-loss may even involve 
more calculation costs than a liability rule.283 For example, taking away 
the tax-exempt status of a public charity requires an organization that 
had not previously recorded income and deductions to calculate those 
amounts. Moreover, as Professors Bittker and Rahdert have noted, cal-
culating the income of many public charities would require addressing 
novel tax issues, such as whether donations are income.284 Indeed, sta-
tus-loss is less like an injunction, which requires few (if any) calcula-
tions, and more like disgorgement, a property-rule remedy that can re-
quire complicated calculations.285 
In sum, liability rules in tax can result in substantial calculation costs, 
which can weigh against using them. But in many instances the calcula-
tion costs imposed by status-loss can also be nontrivial. Moreover, Con-
gress can and should minimize liability rules’ calculation costs by using 
straightforward formulas that draw on inputs that have already been 
quantified for accounting or tax purposes. 
G. Non-Economic Concerns 
The considerations discussed above for deciding between property 
and liability rules relate primarily to maximizing economic efficiency. 
But scholars have identified noneconomic concerns that have a role to 
play in deciding between property and liability rules. For instance, Pro-
fessor Margaret Jane Radin suggests that some belongings (for example, 
family heirlooms) are sufficiently tied up in their owners’ “personhood” 
that they should be protected by property rules, even if liability rules 
were more economically efficient.286 Similar noneconomic considera-
 
283 Ayres, supra note 7, at 197 (noting that the administrative costs of liability rules in 
some instances may be lower than those of property rules). Another issue is that negotiating 
settlements that avoid status-loss may also incur significant calculation costs. Consider for 
example the IRS’s extraordinarily calculation-heavy process for negotiating settlements with 
taxpayers who violate qualified retirement plan requirements protected by status-loss. Rev. 
Proc. 08-50, 2008-35 I.R.B. 464, § 1.03 (overview), § 5.01(5) (defining “Maximum Payment 
Amount”), 14.01(1)-(2) (using a multifactor test for “[d]etermination of sanction”).  
284 Contributions could be either gross income or non-taxable contributions to capital. See 
Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 15, at 307-09, 313-14. But see Hansmann, supra note 15, at 
59 (arguing that Bittker and Rahdert overstate the difficulties in calculating a nonprofit’s net 
income). 
285 For example, for a factory to disgorge profits it makes from polluting, accountants must 
sort out the costs and revenues related to the polluting from those unrelated to the polluting.  
286 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 984–88, 1005–06 
(1982). 
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tions, based on fundamental values, have a role in deciding whether to 
use a property rule or a liability rule to protect a tax-status requirement. 
For example, whenever Congress protects a requirement for tax-
exempt municipal bonds with status-loss, compliance is effectively 
mandated for state and local governments. Federalism may thus weigh 
in favor of protecting municipal-bond requirements with liability rules. 
As another example, some would argue that the requirement that 
churches and other public charities not intervene in political campaigns 
should be protected by a property rule, reflecting a fundamental concern 
that civil society and religion should be kept out of the political sphere. 
But others might argue that the official recognition conferred by public 
charity status is part of the “personhood” of many organizations—
particularly volunteer-driven public charities—and that liability rules are 
preferable, to minimize personhood deprivations. 
A general theory of noneconomic considerations in tax law is beyond 
the scope of this Article. Some considerations weigh towards property 
rules, while others weigh towards liability rules. This is a promising area 
for future scholarship. 
H. Definitional Requirements 
Some requirements must be protected by status-loss for the tax status 
to be workable. For example, one REIT requirement is that it be a “cor-
poration, trust, or association.”287 This requirement must be protected by 
status-loss, since being an entity is an essential assumption of being a 
REIT; an individual being a REIT would be unworkable. Similarly, an-
other REIT requirement is notifying the IRS that it elects REIT status.288 
This requirement must also be protected by status-loss to make the status 
administrable. No matter the benefits of liability rules, some core re-
quirements must be protected by status-loss. 
III. BEYOND PLAIN PROPERTY AND LIABILITY RULES: NEW APPROACHES 
Part II above drew on the property and liability-rule literature to iden-
tify considerations for Congress and other lawmakers to weigh in decid-
ing whether a tax-status requirement should be protected by a property 
rule or a liability rule. Now, Part III goes further, outlining just a few of 
 
287 I.R.C. § 856(a) (2006). 
288 Id. § 856(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(b) (1981); I.R.S. Form 1120-REIT (2012) (filing 
this form acts as the election). 
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the many novel tax-law remedies made possible by applying the proper-
ty- and liability-rule scholarship to tax. 
A. Liability Rules Tailored to Probability of Detection 
Optimal deterrence is generally achieved by multiplying the harm to 
be deterred by a damage multiplier equal to one divided by the probabil-
ity of detection.289 For example, if a tort causes $1 million in harm but 
has only a one-in-three probability of detection, damages should be set 
to $3 million whenever the tort is detected. 
Neither a liability rule nor status-loss will achieve optimal deterrence. 
Liability-rule penalties simply equal the harm, without the damage mul-
tiplier. Meanwhile, status-loss has no tailoring whatsoever for either the 
harm or the probability of detection. Often status-loss will impose a pen-
alty vastly above the amount that results in optimal deterrence.290 
Instead, optimal deterrence can be achieved using “risk-adjusted” lia-
bility rules, generally consisting of the “pure” liability-rule amount that 
compensates for the harm, times an optimal multiplier based on the 
probability of detection by the IRS. For example, suppose that a taxpay-
er violates a requirement, causing $1 million in harm to the government, 
but that the probability of detection is only one-in-three. The taxpayer 
should owe $3 million to the IRS if detected. This rule provides more 
optimal deterrence than either pure liability rules or status-loss.291 It 
 
289 The idea of this sort of damage multiplier can be traced back at least two centuries. See 
Cesare Bonesana Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments (M. De Voltaire trans., 
Albany, W.C. Little 1872) (1759); Jeremy Bentham, A Theory of Legislation (R. Hildreth 
trans., Boston, Weeks, Jordan, & Co. 1840); see also Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punish-
ment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169, 184 (1968); Richard Craswell, Damage 
Multipliers in Market Relationships, 25 J. Legal Stud. 463, 463 (1996) (discussing the idea’s 
origins). The deterrence literature has been fruitfully applied by scholars to tax law. See, e.g., 
James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. Econ. Literature 818, 823-24 (1998); Alex 
Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting 
Penalty, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 569, 576 (2006). Scholars have identified various upwards or 
downwards adjustments that may be appropriate to the 1-divided-by-probability-of-detection 
multiplier. See Craswell, supra at 465–78 (reviewing literature on adjustments).  
290 In rare circumstances (for example, low-value tax statuses or huge multipliers), it may 
be less.  
291 Professor Raskolnikov points out that the low probability of detection common in tax 
may result in risk-adjusted multipliers that are high, making the IRS hesitant to impose them, 
much as the IRS may hesitate to impose status-loss. Raskolnikov, supra note 289, at 597 
n.117; see also supra Subsection II.C.1. But the IRS is still more likely to impose high risk-
adjusted liability rules than status-loss, which is even more draconian. Risk-adjusted liability 
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builds on Kaplow and Shavell’s observation that “the fully optimal rule 
may be neither one with extreme damages (that is, a property rule) nor 
one with damages equal to harm (that is, the conventional liability 
rule).”292 
B. Pliability Rules 
Pliability rules are a straightforward but powerful extension of the 
property and liability rule concept. The term “pliability rule” was intro-
duced by Professors Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky.293 A 
“pliability rule” has three elements: “[1] a first stage rule (either proper-
ty or liability), [2] a triggering event causing a shift between stages, and 
[3] a second stage rule,” also either a property rule or a liability rule.294 
One pliability rule is known to all first-year tort students, set out in 
the venerable tort cases Ploof v. Putnam295 and Vincent v. Lake Erie 
Transportation Co.296 A dock owner is normally allowed to exclude un-
welcome boats, which is a property rule. But necessity, such as a dan-
gerous storm, triggers a shift to a liability rule. During a storm, a boater 
seeking shelter is entitled to temporarily use the dock (per Ploof),297 but 
must compensate the dock owner for any resulting damages (per Vin-
cent).298 Pliability rules optimally deploy property and liability rules in 
the face of changed circumstances, such as emergencies.299 
Currently, tax law rarely uses pliability rules.300 The next two Subsec-
tions give two examples of pliability rules that Congress could enact. 
 
rules are preferable to status-loss for deterring violations not only because they provide op-
timal deterrence, but also because it is more credible that the IRS will impose them.  
292 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 756.  
293 Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 5 
(2002).  
294 Id. at 65.  
295 71 A. 188, 188-89 (Vt. 1908) (holding that plaintiff ship owner could sue defendant 
dock owner for unmooring them from dock where they had moored during storm); Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts §§ 262, 262 cmt. d, 263, 263 cmt. d (1965) (discussing doctrine of 
necessity).  
296 124 N.W. 221, 221-22 (Minn. 1910) (holding that a ship owner who took advantage of 
the Ploof rule during a storm was liable to the dock owner for any damages caused by the 
boat); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 293, at 51 n.180 (discussing Vincent). 
297 71 A. at 189.  
298 124 N.W. at 222.  
299 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 293, at 67.  
300 One (rare) example of pliability rules in tax protects violations of certain REIT re-
quirements relating to asset composition. The requirements are protected by status-loss, with 
a trigger to a 35% liability rule, I.R.C. § 856(c)(7)(C) (2006), if: the failure was “due to rea-
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1. Information-Forcing Pliability Rules 
The following pliability rule could be used to optimally protect an 
ambiguous tax-status requirement. Initially, violations would incur the 
risk-adjusted liability rule (discussed above in Section III.A) that is ad-
justed upward by a multiplier reflecting the risk that the IRS would not 
detect the violation. The triggering mechanism would be the taxpayer 
disclosing on its tax return that it had possibly violated the requirement. 
This disclosure would trigger protecting the requirement with a plain li-
ability rule (without the multiplier). 
This pliability rule completely addresses the objection to liability 
rules that they encourage playing the “audit lottery.” The taxpayer gets 
the plain liability rule only if the arguable violation is disclosed to the 
IRS.301 Otherwise, the taxpayer is subject to the higher risk-adjusted lia-
bility rule that reflects the probability of going undetected by the IRS. 
Even better, the IRS gets timely information on which requirements 
taxpayers are violating or finding ambiguous, rather than haphazardly 
finding a fraction of violations years later on audit. Rules creating incen-
tives for timely information disclosure generally encourage socially effi-
cient resolutions.302 The IRS can use information gathered with this plia-
bility rule to focus on providing guidance clarifying the ambiguous 
requirements actually causing problems for taxpayers.303 
2. Pliability Rules Triggered by Financial Crises 
Temporary financial distress can make it impossible for taxpayers to 
comply over the short run with some tax-status requirements. Tax law 
 
sonable cause and not due to willful neglect”; the REIT files with the IRS a “description of 
each asset that causes” a failure; and the REIT disposes of the asset. Id. 
§ 856(c)(7)(A)(i)-(iii).  
301 Congress and the IRS have been broadly moving over the past decade towards requir-
ing more disclosure from taxpayers, and this proposed pliability rule fits into this trend. One 
notable recent step by the IRS is requiring many companies to disclose many uncertain tax 
positions (UTPs). See Uncertain Tax Position Statement, I.R.S. Form 1120 Schedule UTP 
(2012); I.R.S., Instructions for Schedule UTP (Form 1120) (2012). This Article’s proposed 
liability rule provides substantive incentives for disclosure that correspond to optimal deter-
rence from playing the “audit lottery,” whereas Schedule UTP is purely procedural and only 
applies to a subset of taxpayers.  
302 See Sterk, supra note 27, at 1295.  
303 See Saltzman, supra note 147, ¶ 3.01 (laying out the numerous ways the IRS provides 
guidance to taxpayers).  
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can then compound this temporary financial distress with status-loss, 
which deepens the financial distress and potentially leads to bankruptcy. 
During the 2008 financial crisis, Congress and the IRS took several ad 
hoc, temporary steps to remove the threat of status-loss, to ensure that 
tax law did not worsen the crisis. For example, Congress gave the 
Treasury power, whenever “appropriate in light of distressed conditions 
in the debt capital markets,”304 to suspend rules that would result in sta-
tus-loss for already-distressed debt.305 As another example, the IRS is-
sued guidance moving the requirement that REITs distribute earnings306 
from being protected by status-loss to a liability rule.307 This temporary 
change allowed REITs to conserve cash, helping many to survive the li-
quidity shortage at the heart of the financial crisis. 
A better long-run approach would be to move to pliability rules trig-
gered by financial distress.308 A requirement may currently be protected 
by status-loss that would worsen a taxpayer’s financial distress. If Con-
gress is reluctant to move permanently to a liability rule, then it should 
at least use a pliability rule that shifts to a liability rule whenever the 
Treasury declares distressed market conditions.309 
 
304 I.R.C. § 163(e)(5)(F)(iii).  
305 The relevant tax status was for a debt obligation not being an “applicable high yield 
discount obligation.” Id. § 163(e)(5). (Recall from the text accompanying supra note 75 that 
not being in an unfavorable tax status is a favorable tax status.) See generally Viva Ham-
mer, Taxation of High-Yield Debt—Beware the End of the Reprieve, 2009 Tax Notes 
1095, 1109 (Sept. 14, 2009) (discussing the background of the suspension and arguing for 
continuing it).  
306 I.R.C. § 857(a)(1) (requiring that ninety percent of the REIT’s income, with certain ad-
justments, be distributed each year).  
307 Rev. Proc. 10-12, 2010-3 I.R.B. 302, amplifying and superseding Rev. Proc. 09-15, 
2009-4 I.R.B. 356, amplifying and superseding Rev. Proc. 08-68, 2008-52 I.R.B. 1373. 
These revenue procedures, applicable for tax years from 2008 to 2011, allow REITs to easi-
ly meet the distribution requirements of § 857(a)(1) by distributing stock (that is, not cash) 
that is taxable to shareholders in proportion to how much stock the REIT had to distribute, 
which is equal to the REIT’s shortfall in complying with the requirement. This is a liability 
rule.  
308 Cf. Kontorovich, supra note 3, at 760 (arguing for pliability rules providing property-
rule protection most of the time but moving to liability rules to protect constitutional rights 
in times of emergency).  
309 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 10-11, 2010-4 I.R.B. 326 (finding by the Treasury of continuing 
“distressed conditions in the debt capital markets”). Requiring an express Treasury declara-
tion avoids opportunistic taxpayer behavior, which is consistent with Smith’s observation 
that, “when liability rules are used, as in . . . . the law of necessity, they are often hedged 
about with conditions and restrictions . . . .” Smith, Property, supra note 24, at 1723.  
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In tort law, Ploof v. Putnam310 and Vincent v. Lake Erie Transporta-
tion Co.311 established that a storm shifts a dock owner’s entitlement 
from a property rule to a liability rule, helping boaters.312 It makes sense 
that a financial crisis should similarly shift tax-status requirements from 
status-loss to a liability rule, helping taxpayers weather the storm. 
C. Why Not Other Property Rules? 
The common law employs many property-rule remedies: injunctions, 
jail time, disgorgement, and other supracompensatory damages. Status-
loss is a type of disgorgement. As discussed earlier in Section I.F, tax 
law also uses several other property-rule remedies, such as jail time and 
supracompensatory damages, for serious procedural violations. 
But status-loss is the only property-rule remedy currently used for vi-
olations of tax-status requirements.313 Why not use other property-rule 
remedies, such as injunctions, for violations? 
Forward-looking, consensual injunctions in particular could play a 
constructive role in administering tax statuses.314 Currently, the IRS and 
a taxpayer who violated a requirement can negotiate only over money, 
up to and including status-loss. But Congress should amend the tax 
code315 to authorize the IRS and a taxpayer to enter into a settlement 
whereby the taxpayer retains its tax status, in exchange for consenting to 
the entry of an injunction against future violations of the requirement.316 
 
310 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908).  
311 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). 
312 See supra notes 295-99 and accompanying text.  
313 The federal tax code has apparently only a single provision, I.R.C. § 7409, allowing 
injunctions against violating tax-status requirements. When a public charity “flagrantly” vio-
lates the requirement against political expenditures, § 7409 allows the IRS to seek an injunc-
tion to enjoin it “from further making political expenditures and for such other relief as may 
be appropriate to ensure that the assets of such organization are preserved for charitable or 
other purposes specified in section 501(c)(3).” I.R.C. § 7409(a)(1) (2006). This provision 
appears never to have been used, likely because it requires an extraordinary personal deter-
mination by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Id. § 7409(a)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. 
§ 301.7409-1(b) (1995).  
314 Currently, injunctions play a limited procedural role in tax administration, such as in 
enjoining tax return preparers who engage in fraudulent or inappropriate behavior. I.R.C. 
§ 7407. 
315 The best section to amend would likely be I.R.C. § 7121, relating to closing agreements 
that resolve tax disputes. See Id. § 7121.  
316 The taxpayer could potentially also pay money, although presumably less than without 
the injunction.  
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Consensual injunctions would have several benefits. First, if the vio-
lation occurred because of the requirement’s ambiguity, an injunction 
could clarify what specific steps the taxpayer must take (or avoid taking) 
to comply in the future. Second, injunctions would avoid harming inno-
cent third parties. For example, if a homeless shelter violated a require-
ment and reached a monetary settlement with the IRS, the shelter would 
have fewer economic resources to help the homeless. By contrast, an in-
junction would preserve the shelter’s resources. Similarly, injunctions 
could protect the workers in a retirement plan that violated a require-
ment or the shareholders in a REIT that violated a requirement. 
D. Rule 4 
In their path-breaking article, Calabresi and Melamed recognized that 
all remedies can be classified as either liability rules or property rules, 
and that the initial entitlement can go to either side (for example, either 
to a polluting factory or to a neighboring resident).317 Their description 
can be visualized as a two-by-two matrix, with rows corresponding to 
which side gets the initial entitlement, and columns corresponding to 
whether the initial entitlement is protected by a property rule or a liabil-
ity rule. Of the four boxes in the two-by-two matrix, one box corre-
sponds to a property rule stopping the nuisance (called Rule 1). A sec-
ond box corresponds to giving liability-rule damages to the neighbor, 
but allowing the nuisance to continue (called Rule 2). And a third box 
corresponds to giving the factory a property-rule right to pollute without 
interference or damages (called Rule 3). But the fourth box does not cor-
respond to any traditional remedy. The remedy that fits in this box has 
been dubbed “Rule 4”: 
 
 Property Rule Liability Rule 
Resident Has Initial 
Entitlement 
Rule 1: Injunction 
against pollution 
Rule 2: Damages 
from pollution 
Polluter Has Initial 
Entitlement 
Rule 3: Factory al-
lowed to pollute freely
Rule 4 
 
Calabresi and Melamed recognized that this “Rule 4” was a viable 
remedy: The resident could force the polluter to cease polluting, but the 
 
317 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1115–16.  
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resident would be liable to the polluter for damages that compensate it 
for shutting down.318 
As fate would have it, simultaneously with Calabresi and Melamed’s 
article, the Arizona Supreme Court developed a Rule 4 remedy to handle 
a real-life nuisance dispute in Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb De-
velopment Co.319 The defendant owned a cattle feedlot that had started 
operation when the surrounding area was agricultural. But the plaintiff, a 
real-estate developer, later purchased nearby land and began developing 
it into a residential area. As the development got closer to the cattle 
feedlot, the developer ran into “sales resistance . . . so great that the par-
cels were difficult if not impossible to sell”320 as a result of “flies and the 
odor”321 from the feedlot. 
The developer sued the feedlot owner to permanently enjoin this pub-
lic nuisance, and the trial court granted the injunction. The Arizona Su-
preme Court upheld this injunction—with the unusual modification that 
the developer had to pay the feedlot owner damages to compensate it for 
shutting down its operations.322 
The court gave two primary reasons for this novel remedy. First, the 
feedlot owner was blameless, having had “no indication [at the time the 
feedlot started] that a new city would spring up, full-blown, alongside 
the feeding operation and that the developer of that city would ask the 
court to order [the feedlot owner] to move because of the new city.”323 
Thus, the equities favored granting the initial entitlement to the feedlot 
owner. Second, the “proper and legitimate regard of the courts for the 
rights and interests of the public,”324 particularly the residents of the de-
veloper’s new neighborhood, favored shutting down the feedlot. The 
court clearly felt an obligation to protect the interest of the residents, 
who were largely innocent third parties.325 Rule 4 was the equitable and 
economically efficient resolution. 
 
318 Id. at 1116. The possibility of a Rule 4 had been previously discussed by Professor 
James Atwood. James R. Atwood, Note, An Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 
Stan. L. Rev. 293, 315 (1969); see also Guido Calabresi, Remarks: The Simple Virtues of the 
Cathedral, 106 Yale L.J. 2201, 2204 (1997) (acknowledging Atwood’s discussion).  
319 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972).  
320 Id. at 704. 
321 Id. at 705. 
322 Id. at 708.  
323 Id. at 707–08.  
324 Id. at 708. 
325 Id. at 705 (“It is noted, however, that neither the citizens of Sun City nor Youngtown 
are represented in this lawsuit and the suit is solely between Del E. Webb Development 
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Rule 4 can be used in tax law for much the same reasons—to make 
the remedy’s burden fall most equitably and most efficiently on the 
least-cost avoider. In tax law, Rule 4 imposes status-loss (equivalent to 
the injunction stopping the feedlot operations in Spur), but forgives the 
entire increase in taxes that otherwise results from the status-loss (equiv-
alent to the damages in Spur that the developer owed to the feedlot own-
er).326 With respect to the taxpayer, Rule 4 is a complete wash, because 
the tax status is lost, but the IRS forgives the resulting liability. Yet third 
parties who derive tax benefits from the tax status are impacted.  
For example, Rule 4 can be applied to a qualified retirement plan. Re-
call that employers receive a deduction for contributions to their work-
ers’ retirement plans.327 This tax benefit to the employer is separate from 
the tax benefit that the plan trust itself receives from the tax status. If an 
employer erroneously causes a plan to lose its qualification, a Rule 4 
remedy would be to cause the plan trust itself to lose its tax status, but to 
forgive the resulting taxes on the trust. This is a wash with respect to the 
trust, thus preserving the assets for the retirement of workers (who are 
innocent third parties akin to the residents in Spur). But the employer 
loses the benefit of its tax deduction. This Rule 4 remedy imposes the 
burden on the employer,328 who is the least-cost avoider of a violation.  
Professor Samuel Brunson has proposed what is, in effect, a Rule 4 
remedy for public charities’ violations of the no-political-participation 
requirement.329 He proposes that, when a public charity violates that re-
quirement, the public charity be allowed to maintain its status, but that a 
 
Company and Spur Industries, Inc.”); id. at 707 (“Were [the developer] the only party in-
jured, we would feel justified in holding that the doctrine of ‘coming to the nuisance’ would 
have been a bar to the relief . . . .”).  
326 In the analogy between tax-status violations and the nuisance in Spur, the IRS is analo-
gous to the developer, and the taxpayer with the tax status is analogous to the feedlot owner. 
Just as the feedlot owner’s flies and odors harmed the developer’s land, so too the taxpayer’s 
violation caused harm. Meanwhile, third parties, such as workers participating in a qualified 
retirement plan or recipients of charity from a public charity, are akin to the residents in Spur 
who had bought houses from the developer and whom the court felt an obligation to protect. 
See supra note 325 and accompanying text.  
327 I.R.C. § 404(a)(1), 404(a)(5), 404(a)(6) (2006). See generally Perdue, supra note 112, 
¶ 1.02[1][a]; supra Subsection I.C.4. 
328 Because the employer loses the deduction for contributions over affected years, the 
workers do not have income from the contributions. I.R.C. § 83(h). But workers do lose 
some tax benefits if the plan becomes disqualified. See id. § 402(c); Perdue, supra note 112, 
¶ 1.02[2][b]. A Rule 4 remedy can simply be tweaked to allow workers to keep such bene-
fits. 
329 Brunson, supra note 219, at 159–68.  
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percentage330 of its donors’ contributions be denied deductibility. 
Brunson’s innovative remedy protects the charity’s beneficiaries (for ex-
ample, students at a university or the homeless in a church-run shelter), 
while getting compensation for the government from donors, who are 
generally well situated to monitor the charity and prevent it from violat-
ing the requirement. 
E. Less Than Zero: The IRS Put-Option 
The discovery of Rule 4 suggested the possibility of other, previously 
undiscovered remedies. One fascinating source of new remedies comes 
from the recognition that traditional liability rules are effectively call op-
tions.331 
Call options give their holder the option (but not the obligation) to 
purchase an entitlement at a fixed price. A $25 call option on IBM stock 
allows the option’s holder to buy IBM stock for $25, which makes sense 
if the stock is later above $25. But the holder need not exercise the op-
tion. Similarly, a traditional liability rule protecting residents from a pol-
luting factory gives the factory a call option to buy the right to pollute 
from the residents for a court-determined price (that is, damages). But 
the factory need not exercise this option, because it can simply stop pol-
luting, which makes sense if stopping is cheaper than the court-
determined price. 
While call options are options to buy at a fixed price, put options are 
options to sell at a fixed price. For example, a $25 put option on IBM 
stock allows the option’s holder to sell IBM stock for $25, which makes 
sense if the stock is later below $25. But the holder need not exercise the 
option. Scholars recognized that if traditional liability rules are call op-
tions, then there could be alternative liability rules that are put options.332 
For example, neighboring residents could be given a put option for their 
entitlement to clean air: They could have the right to enjoin the pollu-
tion, plus the option to force the factory to buy the right to pollute for a 
 
330 The percentage would be calculated by a formula reflecting the expenditures involved 
or the size of the audience reached. Id. at 159–62.  
331 See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 7, 14–18; Ian Ayres, Protecting Property with Puts, 32 Val. 
U. L. Rev. 793, 794–95 (1998); Krier & Schwab, supra note 26, at 443; Levmore, supra note 
29, at 2159; Morris, supra note 29, at 852.  
332 Ayres & Talley, supra note 24, at 1062; see also Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. My-
ers, Principles of Corporate Finance 557–59 (5th ed. 1996) (discussing put-call parity).  
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court-determined price (that is, damages).333 In other words, residents 
could choose between an injunction and court-determined damages. 
This put-option liability rule is even more beneficial for the resi-
dents—and harsher for the factory—than the corresponding property 
rule. Options can have substantial value, even when it is not yet clear 
whether exercising them will ultimately make sense.334 The put-option 
liability rule gives the residents the value of being able to enjoin the fac-
tory, plus the value of the option to sell for court-determined damages if 
that turns out to be more favorable.335 Conversely, the factory bears the 
detriment of being enjoined, minus the possibility of being forced to pay 
damages. Professor Ian Ayres has observed that protecting the residents 
with a property rule leaves the factory with zero value, but that the put-
option liability rule leaves the factory with “less than zero.”336 Addition-
ally, this remedy causes the factory’s payoff to have greater variability, 
which means more risk.337 Assuming the factory is risk averse, this risk 
leaves the factory worse off. 
If Congress really wants to crack down on violations of a particular 
requirement, it can give the IRS a put-option liability rule.338 If a taxpay-
er violates the requirement, the IRS could choose between imposing sta-
tus-loss and imposing a liability rule.339 Just as in the example with the 
polluting factory, this put-option remedy maximizes the IRS’s expected 
outcome340 and leaves the taxpayer with “less than zero.”341 It guarantees 
 
333 Ayres, supra note 7, at 15–16 (calling this remedy Rule 6, but also recognizing the var-
ied names given to this remedy).  
334 Id. at 1–3.  
335 Ayres, supra note 7, at 17–21; Krier & Schwab, supra note 26, at 473; Levmore, supra 
note 29, at 2163; Morris, supra note 24, at 855–56; Rose, supra note 4, at 2178–79.  
336 Ayres, supra note 7, at 17.  
337 See id. at 26 (“[A]n option . . . tends to increase the variance in the non-option holder’s 
payoff.”).  
338 This remedy is what Ayres calls Rule 6. Id. at 15. Tax law could also have a remedy 
giving the put-option to the taxpayer, what Ayres calls Rule 5. Id. But it is unpalatable to 
give a favorable option to a taxpayer who violates a requirement.  
339 A variant of this remedy would statutorily specify factors the IRS must consider in de-
ciding between status-loss and the liability rule, allowing courts to review the IRS’s decision 
(for example, for abuse of discretion). This variant converges towards being a pliability rule, 
while splitting the authority for exercising the put option between the IRS and the courts.  
340 Additionally, the IRS’s interest in sound tax administration and ability to observe 
trends in taxpayers’ actions may make it a “better chooser” of the remedy. Cf. Ayres, supra 
note 7, at 26 (listing factors that make one side a “better chooser”).  
341 Id. at 17.  
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that the taxpayer will, at a minimum, pay a compensatory amount, and 
potentially will suffer draconian status-loss. 
Some may object that giving the IRS the option to choose its remedy 
contravenes the principle that similarly situated taxpayers should be 
treated equally.342 But that makes this approach perfect for seriously 
cracking down on violations. Most taxpayers crave certainty, and pro-
tecting a requirement with a put-option liability rule increases variability 
for any taxpayer that violates the requirement. 
IV. TAX LAW’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROPERTY AND LIABILITY RULE 
SCHOLARSHIP 
The previous Part looked at novel remedies the broader property and 
liability rule scholarship could contribute to tax law. This Part looks at 
how tax law can enrich the broader property- and liability-rule scholar-
ship.  
Calabresi and Melamed’s path-breaking article focused almost entire-
ly on remedies in torts and property law.343 Contracts scholars advanced 
the property- and liability-rule scholarship by bringing contract law’s 
focus on bargaining and information disclosure.344 Still others have ad-
vanced the literature by considering examples from intellectual proper-
ty345 and constitutional law.346 Each new area has provided new exam-
ples and new insights on the relative merits of different rules and has 
unmasked underlying assumptions. Tax is no different. 
A. Relaxing Assumption of Constantly Increasing Utility 
The model of IRS utility derived above in Subsection II.C.1 to ex-
plain why the IRS often fails to impose status-loss unmasks an implicit 
assumption throughout the existing property- and liability-rule scholar-
 
342 See Bittker & Lokken, supra note 107, ¶ 3.1.4 (discussing horizontal equity, the princi-
ple that similarly situated taxpayers should be treated equally).  
343 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1. Their article opened with the sentence: “Only rare-
ly are Property and Torts approached from a unified perspective.” Id. at 1089.  
344 Rose, supra note 4, at 2197 (noting the contributions of the “eminent contracts schol-
ars” Ayres and Talley to the property- and liability-rule literature).  
345 See, e.g., Lemley & Weiser, supra note 3, at 784; Sterk, supra note 192, at 1327–33. 
346 See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 3, at 764.  
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ship. All existing scholarship assumes that a party’s utility increases 
with each additional dollar of value received (or not paid out).347 
But this assumption often does not apply to the IRS, which is influ-
enced not only by revenues but also by concern for proportionality and 
for avoiding negative scrutiny from congresspersons and the media. In 
such instances, beyond a certain level, the IRS’s utility actually declines 
for each dollar it receives from the opposing party (the taxpayer), as can 
be seen in the decline in the curve in Figure 2 in Subsection II.C.1.348 
The IRS is almost certainly not the only party to have declining utility 
for additional dollars received beyond a certain point. Many government 
agencies impose remedies on regulated parties, either directly with fees 
and fines, or indirectly through mandates to take certain actions. These 
remedies can range from compensatory liability rules up to property 
rules. Beyond a certain point, agencies may face the same proportionali-
ty, political, and media concerns that lead the IRS to have declining 
utility—as well as the same problems with deterrence and negotiation. 
This is a promising area for future research (indeed, this Article will 
hopefully encourage scholars to apply the property- and liability-rule 
framework to other agency-dominated areas of law). 
Many private actors are also subject to political, media, and similar 
pressures. For example, a real-estate developer suing a polluting factory 
may be subject to similar pressures. High damages might lead the facto-
ry to lay off workers, who are also voters, making it harder for the de-
veloper to get local permits in the future. In this situation, the developer 
might have declining utility for additional money extracted from the fac-
 
347 Ayres and Madison discuss an important but different situation: entitlement holders 
who receive less value from specific performance (a property rule) than from compensatory 
damages (a liability rule). Ayres & Madison, supra note 136, at 61. This situation can incen-
tivize strategic threats, such as requiring specific performance, even if that is economically 
inefficient. But Ayres and Madison still assume throughout that all parties will always at-
tempt to maximize the dollar value they receive (or minimize the dollar value they lose). By 
contrast, the IRS will often prefer to receive less money from taxpayers. 
 The difference between the IRS and the parties in Ayres and Madison’s analysis is demon-
strated by moving $1 down from a full property-rule remedy. If Ayres and Madison’s plain-
tiff had the choice between (a) getting specific performance or (b) getting specific perfor-
mance but having to pay the defendant $1, the plaintiff would choose (a). But, as Figure 2 in 
Subsection II.C.1 shows, if the IRS has the choice between (a) imposing the status-loss 
amount or (b) imposing the status-loss amount minus $1, it will choose (b) in many circum-
stances. That is the essence of declining utility from each dollar. 
348 See Subsection II.C.1. 
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tory. This is another promising area for future research, possibly with 
implications for understanding land-use patterns. 
B. Taker’s Information Costs 
Smith argues that property rules give entitlement holders better incen-
tives to invest in information about their entitlement.349 Investments in 
information are crucial to economic efficiency, entrepreneurship, and 
innovation.350 
For example, assume that Blackacre has always been used to grow 
wheat, and that its fair market value reflects its wheat-producing capaci-
ty.351 Blackacre’s owner O invests in information about whether Black-
acre’s soil, weather, and altitude allow for growing crops more profita-
ble than wheat. Assume that O succeeds, discovering that barley is more 
profitable than wheat for Blackacre. If O is protected by a property rule, 
O can capture all the profits from this discovery. These profits are O’s 
incentive to invest in information. But if O is protected only by a liabil-
ity rule, then a taker T could force O to sell Blackacre for a court-
determined price, and T could grow barley and reap the profits.352 Liabil-
ity rules thus undermine O’s incentive to invest in information about the 
best crops to grow on Blackacre.353 
But tax law reveals that information-cost considerations sometimes 
weigh against property rules. Recall that the IRS holds the entitlement to 
be free of requirement violations,354 just as O held the entitlement to 
Blackacre. Meanwhile, the taxpayer is the non–entitlement holder, just 
 
349 Smith, Property, supra note 24, at 1748.  
350 Id. at 1724–25 (citing Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 19–21, 197–232 
(1921)).  
351 Cf. Smith, Property, supra note 24, at 1729–30 (using the example of a future tourist 
attraction on Blackacre).  
352 O could attempt to persuade the court that Blackacre’s value should be based on its 
ability to grow barley. But convincing courts of speculative future values is difficult and 
might require expensive expert testimony and litigation. See id. at 1729.  
353 Cf. id. at 1730 (making same point with respect to future tourist attraction on Black-
acre).  
354 See Section I.E. The entitlement could theoretically be given to either the IRS or the 
taxpayer, but tax law virtually always assigns the entitlement to the IRS, with the only ques-
tion being whether the IRS’s entitlement is protected by a property or liability rule. Similar-
ly, the entitlement to use Blackacre could theoretically be assigned to either the owner O or 
the taker T, but property law virtually always assigns it to the owner, with the only question 
being whether a property or liability rule protects the owner’s entitlement.  
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like the taker T in the example above.355 Yet we want taxpayers to invest 
in information about uses of their tax status. For example, public chari-
ties may develop innovative mechanisms for helping charitable recipi-
ents, or a REIT may develop new financing structures for avoiding home 
foreclosures. Innovative uses of tax statuses run a higher likelihood of 
violating unclear or ambiguous tax-status requirements.356 Protecting re-
quirements with status-loss can deter innovative uses of the tax status, 
decreasing the incentive to invest in information about the socially bene-
ficial uses of the status.357 
Thus, information costs can weigh towards liability rules in tax law. 
The same will be true in any area of law where an innovation runs the 
risk of incurring a draconian property rule. This is another promising ar-
ea for future research. 
C. Liability Rules as “Gentle Nudges”; Property Rules as “Hard 
Shoves” 
Kahan has argued that “gentle nudges,” slightly above what decision 
makers see as a proportionate remedy, often better promote compliance 
norms than draconian “hard shoves” that decision makers hesitate to im-
pose, thus making other decision makers also hesitate to impose them.358 
This Article argued above in Subsection II.C.3 that liability rules for re-
quirement violations may better promote compliance norms than status-
loss, which IRS employees may view as draconian. 
Kahan’s insight applies to the broader property- and liability-rule lit-
erature. Liability rules aim to compensate the entitlement holder, and 
therefore often correlate with what most decision makers see as a pro-
portionate remedy. Liability rules may be akin to “gentle nudges” that 
protect entitlement holders better than property rules, which are “hard 
shoves.” 
 
355 See discussion supra note 354.  
356 See, e.g., discussion supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text (noting uncertainty 
about whether a common financing transaction causes violations of REIT asset tests).  
357 The IRS expressly refuses to provide guidance on many ambiguous areas. See Rev. 
Proc. 11-3, 2011-1 I.R.B. 111.  
358 Kahan, supra note 238, at 608.  
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D. Empirical and Experimental Opportunities 
Although scholars have developed numerous insights on when to use 
property or liability rules, as well as some novel remedies, few have 
been applied in practice. Common-law judges are inherently reluctant to 
use new or untested remedies, and remedies are typically determined on 
a facts-and-circumstances basis by individual judges and have little 
precedential value.359 
By contrast, tax law is a much more promising area for applying the 
property- and liability-rule scholarship, for several reasons. First, tax law 
is largely statutory. Unlike judges, legislative bodies have repeatedly 
demonstrated a willingness to enact innovative, even quirky, new tax 
proposals from scholars and others.360 Second, any government that has 
the power to tax can benefit from this scholarship. State or foreign tax 
laws provide as good a testing ground as U.S. federal tax law. Third, all 
lawmakers have a strong incentive to implement innovations that can in-
crease tax revenues while improving efficiency for taxpayers. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has demonstrated that tax law has both property rules and 
liability rules, and that this framework can improve tax law. When de-
ciding between property and liability rules, Congress currently does not 
look at anywhere near all of the considerations that the property- and li-
ability-rule literature has developed. This should change. By drawing on 
this literature, Congress could better understand the often-subtle costs 
and benefits of the two rules—leading to better tax legislation. And by 
looking to the novel remedies that have sprung out of the property- and 
liability-rule literature, Congress could expand the range of remedies 
that it gives to the IRS. 
This Article certainly does not identify all the ways the property- and 
liability-rule distinction can be applied to tax law. Fully exploring the 
 
359 Sherwin, supra note 23, at 2085 (“[J]udicial practice strongly favors case-by-case deci-
sionmaking under loosely defined standards.”); Sherwin, supra note 136, at 19 (“To the ex-
tent that future courts treat prior decisions as examples or rules of thumb, prior decisions do 
not establish property rules.”).  
360 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Enforcing Dividend Withholding on Derivatives, 121 
Tax Notes 747 (Nov. 10, 2008) (proposing a reform that became law in 2010 with the en-
actment of I.R.C. § 871(l)); Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A. Soled, Debunking the Basis Myth 
Under the Income Tax, 81 Ind. L.J. 539, 583 (2006) (proposing a reform that became law in 
2008 with the enactment of I.R.C. § 6045(g)).  
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benefits of this framework for tax law will take other articles and other 
scholars. The broader property- and liability-rule literature is an area of 
continuing ferment and debate.361 Scholars will identify new considera-
tions weighing in favor of property rules or liability rules, and they will 
develop more novel remedies. Recognizing that tax law has both proper-
ty and liability rules will allow these insights to be used to improve tax. 
Meanwhile, examples and insights from tax will contribute back to this 
broader ferment and debate, across many other areas of law. 
 
 
361 Ayres, supra note 7, at 183–200 (discussing the debate).  
